




THE ORIGINALIST MYTH OF THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 
Peter M. Shane* 
Both Executive Power Vesting Clauses and clauses equivalent to Article II’s Faithful Execution 
Clause were prevalent in early state constitutions that nonetheless fractured gubernatorial control 
over state bureaucracies. Originalist defenders of a unitary executive reading of the federal 
Constitution nonetheless dismiss the interpretive significance of the pre-1787 state constitutions. 
These early texts supposedly paid only lip service to separation of powers principles, while 
presenting the Framers chiefly with examples of government structure to avoid. The core problem 
with this originalist stance is that state constitutions written in the first decades after 1789 
persisted in using the same clauses, now found also in Article II, to describe state governments in 
which governors continued to lack unitary control. Close study of the state constitutions and state 
administrative practice under them thus belie any “unitary executive” reading of Article II that 
purports to be based on “original public meaning.” These findings are also consistent with the 
early history of federal public administration, which corroborates a common understanding that 
Article II’s vesting of executive power permitted substantial legislative control over the allocation of 
decisional authority within the executive branch. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Debates about the President’s constitutional relationship to the federal 
bureaucracy are as old as the Republic and show little sign of abating.  
Proponents of what I would call the “hard version” of the unitary executive 
thesis interpret the Constitution as guaranteeing the President plenary 
authorities, which Congress may not limit, both to discharge unelected 
executive administrators at will and to direct how they shall exercise any and 
all discretionary authority that those officials possess under law.1  Dissenters, 
of whom I am one, agree that the President enjoys such control over 
subordinate personnel who assist the President in performing specific 
constitutionally enumerated tasks, such as negotiating treaties or 
commanding the military.  We believe, however, that the scope of the 
President’s removal and directive powers with respect to most administrators 
is subject to congressional regulation.2  In this more pluralist reading of the 
 
 1 See generally STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008) (describing the omnipotency of 
the American presidency and why the other branches of government are subservient to 
it). 
 2 See generally PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009) (explicating how the executive branch is limited by the 
other two branches and why such limitations are an important facet of democracy).  
Within what I would call this latter checks-and-balances camp, scholars further divide on 
how to read administrative statutes.  Some argue that, in the face of statutory silence, we 
should presume that Congress intends the President to have both complete removal and 
directive powers.  See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
2245 (2001) (delineating two ways to interpret an organic statute’s silence on delegation: 
assuming it runs from Congress only to the agency official, or assuming that delegation is 
still subject to the ultimate control of the President).  This might be called the “soft 
unitary executive” thesis.  Others argue—again, I am in this group—that, even if a 
removal power is presumed (a presumption that may be overcome by the nature of the 
official’s particular tasks per Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958)), a directive 
power should not be.  See Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the 
Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 277 (2006) (arguing that the President has statutory 
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Constitution, a President may have authority to persuade an official to 
exercise her lawful administrative discretion in ways the President favors; if 
the administrator demurs, however, the President has to live with the 
disagreement unless the administrator is legally subject to policy-based 
removal and the President is willing to remove that official. 
With few exceptions, proponents of a hard unitary executive defend 
their reading of the Constitution on purportedly originalist grounds.  It has 
been argued, for example, from a variety of historical sources that the hard 
version of the unitary executive is what the Framers or ratifiers intended and 
that we are bound by their intentions.  The primary—in my judgment, 
fatal—problem with the argument from original intent is that early 
administrative practice was often at odds with this vision of the presidency.  
As Jerry Mashaw has written, the First Congress “seems to have had no fixed 
general idea about the relationship of the President to administration.”3  It is 
odd to think that our earliest legislators, many of whom helped to draft the 
Constitution, were either unaware of original intentions or indifferent to 
them. 
A somewhat different strategy of originalist interpretation, however, 
relies less on a search for intent per se and more on what “new originalists” 
call the “original public meaning” of the Article II text.4  Under this 
approach, what would make the hard version of the unitary executive 
binding is not what Framers or ratifiers might subjectively have had in mind, 
but rather what a contemporary educated reader of the Article II text would 
 
authority to direct administration of laws under statutes only when that statute grants 
power to the President in name); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?  The President 
in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007) (questioning whether Congress’s 
grant of authority to the President confers the ability to made administrative decisions or 
simply oversee agency decision processes). 
 3 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Governmental Practice and Presidential Direction: Lessons from the 
Antebellum Republic?, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 659, 668 (2009) (arguing that based on early 
government administrative statutes, it is clear that Congress did not have a singular 
definition of the roles of the President and administrative agencies). 
 4  For example, it was on the basis of its understanding of “original public meaning” that 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit would have held that the 
President’s recess appointments power may be exercised only during the Senate’s 
intersession recesses and only to fill vacancies first arising during those recesses.  Noel 
Canning v. N.L.R.B., 705 F.3d 490, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2013), aff’d on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 
2550  (2014) (“In context, ‘the Recess’ refers to a specific state of the legislature, so 
sources other than general dictionaries are more helpful in elucidating the term's 
original public meaning.”).  Although affirming the Court of Appeals on a different 
ground—namely, the brevity of the period of adjournment at issue—the Supreme Court 
rejected the Court of Appeals interpretation on both these points.   The Court concluded 
that the Recess Appointments Clause was too ambiguous to yield a persuasive originalist 
interpretation.  N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561 (2014) (“The 
constitutional text is . . .  ambiguous.  And we believe the Clause’s purpose demands [a] 
broader interpretation.”). 
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have taken it to prescribe.  The hard version of the unitary executive, in this 
view, follows from the original public meaning of the Article II declaration 
that “[t]he executive power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America,” read either in isolation or as contextualized by other key 
clauses of Article II.  This reading is rooted in a syllogism: “Executive 
power,” in the late eighteenth century, meant “not legislative” and “having 
the power to put in act the laws.”5  Vesting “the” executive power meant 
vesting all of executive power as a singular, indivisible authority.  Vesting 
that authority in “a” President meant that it would be shared by no other 
individual. 
In 2003, Professor Saikrishna Prakash provided a thoughtful and learned 
defense of this reading, purporting to show how the textualist syllogism 
makes sense of other portions of Article II and is corroborated by more 
contextual evidence from eighteenth century political theory, debates in 
Philadelphia and during the ratification period, and statements by George 
Washington, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and Justice James Wilson 
following the founding.6  His historical exploration leads him to conclude 
that the federal Article II Executive Power Clause not only allows presidents 
to direct those inferior officers charged with carrying out the law, but 
actually authorizes the federal Chief Executive to “execute any federal law by 
himself.”7  His position would go a long way toward establishing a hard 
 
 5 Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 716 
(2003) [hereinafter Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power] (quoting 1 SAMUEL 
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 684 (4th ed. 1773)).  Professor 
Prakash has further elaborated upon his views in SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, 
IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 1–11 
(2015) [hereinafter PRAKASH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE] 
(defending the plausibility of discerning a clear conception of the Article II presidency by 
analyzing eighteenth century usage). 
 6 See Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, supra note 5, at 713–42 (exploring the 
textual foundations for the chief executive thesis).  His newer work argues that late 
eighteenth century usage substantiates a widespread understanding that federal 
“executive power” referred to the “execution of federal law, management of foreign 
affairs, and direction of executive officers.”  PRAKASH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE, supra note 5, at 63, 80.  He also offers a somewhat different 
formulation—a “bundle of powers—over law execution, foreign affairs, and the military.”  
Id. at 68.  At a high level of generality, I do not disagree and even endorse Professor 
Prakash’s general position that the Executive Power Vesting Clause is properly 
understood as implying some grants of power beyond the precise terms of the rest of 
Article II.  But, as Professor Prakash acknowledges, “[T]here were disagreements [in 
eighteenth century America] about the scope of executive power.”  Id. at 66.  Where 
Professor Prakash and I differ is in our views as to which aspects of executive power fell 
within “widespread understanding” and which aspects were subjects of “disagreement,” or 
simply not well-conceptualized at the time. 
 7 Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, supra note 5, at 704.  In two respects, the 
article does not purport to be a full-throttle textualist defense of unitary executive theory.  
First, Professor Prakash does not attempt to “fully explicate what is meant by presidential 
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version of the unitary executive; it would recognize a presidential power to 
make every act of the federal executive establishment quite literally his own. 
Although Professor Prakash’s work repays close reading, it remains 
unpersuasive for two main reasons.  The first, which I will not dwell on at 
any length, is that early attorneys general with very different political 
ideologies seem to have taken the precisely opposite view on the very point 
Professor Prakash stresses: 
Attorneys General [William] Wirt and [Roger] Taney were ideological 
opposites concerning the true institutional seat of democracy in the 
United States.  Wirt placed it in Congress; Taney in the President.  But, 
both agreed that the President could not substitute his judgment for an 
officer charged by statute with a particular function.8 
 
control of law execution,” id. at 705, thus perhaps leaving some ambiguity concerning the 
scope of presidential entitlement with regard to controlling subordinate officers.  Second, 
in the 2003 article he does not deal with the scope of the President’s removal power, id. at 
704–05, often regarded as another essential attribute of the “unitary executive.”  As 
Professor Prakash’s other work makes clear, however, his position on presidential removal 
is complex and perhaps unique.  He does not think Congress is constitutionally entitled 
to create the “quasi-judicial” or “quasi-legislative” offices that control the so-called 
independent agencies.  See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s 
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 567–68 (1994) (arguing that non-executive 
administrations do not exist because “no independent federal administrative officers were 
ever contemplated by the Framers”).  But he argues that—to the extent Congress does 
create such offices—the President’s Article II removal powers do not extend to them.  See 
Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1784 (2006) (“[T]he 
Constitution does not grant [the President] the authority to remove the quasi-judicial 
and quasi-legislative officers who control the independent agencies.  If the President’s 
removal power arises from the grant of executive power, the President has far less 
removal authority than is commonly supposed.”).  If I understand this correctly, the 
Prakash view of Article II would give the President authority to exercise personally all law 
execution powers vested in any officer within the administrative bureaucracy, but power 
to remove only those officers who were doing entirely “executive” work.  For its part, the 
Supreme Court has disavowed the utility of such formal labels for delimiting the scope of 
the President’s removal powers.  See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 (1988) (“[O]ur 
present considered view is that the determination of whether the Constitution allows 
Congress to impose a ‘good cause’-type restriction on the President’s power to remove an 
official cannot be made to turn on whether or not that official is classified as ‘purely 
executive.’”). 
 8 Mashaw, supra note 3, at 696.  For Wirt’s views, see The President and Accounting Officers, 
1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624 (1823) (opining that recourse from the settlement of public 
accounts should be taken to the judiciary or Congress, not the executive department of 
the government); The President and the Comptroller, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 636 (1823) 
(refusing the President the power to intervene in the settlement of accounts before the 
Comptroller); The President and Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 678 (1824) 
(prohibiting the President from interfering with the settlement of accounts of army 
contractors); The President and Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 705 (1825) (“The 
President cannot legally interfere with duties belonging to the accounting officers.”); The 
President and Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 706 (1825) (The President cannot 
legally interfere with the accounting officers whilst in the discharge of their duties.”).  For 
Taney’s views, see Jewels of the Princess Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482, 485–89 (1831) 
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Indeed, based upon his own extensive research into the first century of 
federal public administration, Jerry Mashaw regards as one of the few points 
“settled” in the early decades a rule that presidents lack authority “to 
exercise personally the statutory jurisdiction of an officer empowered by 
Congress to make a particular decision or to take a particular action.”9 
 
(recommending the President order the district attorney to cease prosecution and return 
the stolen jewels to the minister of the King of the Netherlands); Accounts and 
Accounting Officers, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 507–08 (1832) (holding that the President does 
not have “the power to enter into the correctness of the account” for the purpose of 
fixing an accounting officer’s error).  In his 2015 book, Professor Prakash argues that 
Wirt’s position was wrong.  See PRAKASH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE, 
supra note 5, at 190.  I presume he would also take this position (i.e., that Wirt was 
mistaken in his belief that the comptroller and his accountants were bound to have 
latitude in practice) with regard to Taney.  He does note, however, that Wirt’s view 
actually echoes precisely the same position taken by President Jefferson in 
correspondence addressing the issue.  See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin 
Latrobe (June 2, 1808), in THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NATIONAL CAPITAL 429, 431 (Saul 
K. Padover ed., 1946) (illustrating President Jefferson’s unwillingness to interfere with 
the settlement of accounts with the Treasury as this was the legal job of the Comptroller). 
 9 See Mashaw, supra note 3, at 695.  In support of a contrary view, Professor Prakash’s 2015 
book mentions an incident during which President Washington appeared personally to 
exercise all the legal powers vested in his cabinet secretaries because none was physically 
present to do so.  PRAKASH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE, supra note 
5, at 98.  The actual story, however, may support only a more limited claim.  The cabinet 
officers were apparently out of Philadelphia because of the raging Yellow Fever epidemic 
of 1793.  From Mount Vernon, President Washington wrote to his Secretary of War, 
Henry Knox:  “The heads of Departments being absent the disputes arising between the 
agents of the Powers at War, and other matters, are transmitted immediately to me.”  
Letter from George Washington to Henry Knox (Oct. 15, 1793), 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-14-02-0151.  It is not clear 
what “other matters” encompassed.  However, the President’s personal resolution of 
disputes between agents of France and England, who were then at war, would seem quite 
directly to implicate his foreign affairs powers—and might thus have had little relevance 
to his supervision of ordinary domestic administration.  Likewise, the epidemic posed so 
extraordinary a challenge to administration that the President might have thought 
himself constitutionally bound as Congress’s faithful agent to go beyond the literal terms 
of statutes vesting authority in particular officers in order to achieve the larger purposes 
of those statutes.  A somewhat expansive view of his role as Congress’s agent would also 
make sense of a 1796 episode in which President Washington, in violation of a statute’s 
precise command, continued to direct the construction of ships even after the United 
States made peace with Algiers, so that Congress would be able to reconsider the impact 
of ending construction abruptly.  See PRAKASH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL 
EXECUTIVE, supra note 5, at 94 (recounting President Washington’s construction of 
warships despite statutory commands to stop construction).  It was on just such an 
implied agency theory that the Supreme Court many years later approved President 
William Taft’s technical violation of a statute in order to give Congress time to reconsider 
the potential impact of literal compliance.  For an explanation of this theory, see United 
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 475 (1915) (finding that, as an agent of Congress, 
the Executive was in charge of the public domain). 
  Nor is it instructive that President Washington personally directed the militia in enforcing 
federal law.  The authority for those actions presumably derived neither from the 
Executive Power Vesting Clause, nor from his general faithful execution obligation.  
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The second point, which this Article is the first to describe in detail, is 
that similar executive power clauses were also deployed in state constitutions 
before and after 1787, but the texts of those constitutions and state practice 
pursuant to them reveal no agreement at all with the hard version of unitary 
executive theory.  To his credit, Professor Prakash takes due note of the pre-
1787 constitutions.  But he dismisses their textual implications because, 
“though all chief executives were vested with the ‘executive power’ or the 
equivalent, in many states the executive power was exercised at the 
sufferance of the legislature.”10  Consequently, Professor Prakash argues, as a 
matter of federal Framer intent, “state executives were not the templates for 
the federal chief executive.  Rather, most state executives stood as reminders 
of what to avoid.”11 
What is missing, however, from Professor Prakash’s reading of the texts is 
recognition that post-1787 state constitutions took essentially the same 
textual approach to structuring the executive branch as did the pre-1787 
constitutions and federal Article II.  In other words, for a textualist to dismiss 
as Professor Prakash does the evidence of the early state constitutions, she 
would have to argue two distinct propositions.  First, the 1787 readers of the 
draft federal Article II would have read the federal text as signifying 
differently from the same words as used in the pre-1787 state constitutions.  
Second, readers of the post-1787 state constitutions, which duplicated the 
now-ratified language of federal Article II, would have understood the 
identical clauses of the new state constitutions to operate more as they had 
in state constitutions prior to 1787 than they would be expected to operate 
under the federal Article II.  It would take a highly counterintuitive theory of 
communication to support such a convoluted hypothesis. 
Because arguments for the hard version of the unitary executive are 
almost always originalist, Part I of this Article explains in somewhat more 
detail the premises of originalism in its formalist versions—both “original 
intent” and its textualist cousin, “original public meaning.”  Part II presents 
the evidence from the texts of state constitutions roughly contemporaneous 
with the U.S. Constitution.  Part III examines state administrative practice 
pursuant to the early constitutions to confirm that state legislatures acted 
pursuant to the more relaxed idea of executive control than unitarians have 
 
Rather, Congress, pursuant to Article I, § 8, had authorized calling state militia into 
federal service for enforcing federal law, and President Washington, having triggered his 
statutory authority, then acted pursuant to his explicit authority to act as “Commander in 
Chief of . . . the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the 
United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also PRAKASH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE, supra note 5, at 98 (describing President Washington’s extensive 
involvement in administrative matters). 
 10 Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, supra note 5, at 760. 
 11 Id. at 763. 
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recognized.  Part IV then shows how this pervasive understanding of the 
fairly limited implications of executive power vesting clauses makes early 
federal administrative practice much less surprising.  The concluding 
section explains why the syllogistic reading of Article II’s Executive Power 
Clause does not belie the historical evidence, and urges that a persuasive 
settlement of the unitary executive debate requires a nonoriginalist exercise 
in constitutional construction.  It suggests the practical factors on which 
such a construction of the Constitution ought to rely. 
I.  VARIETIES OF ORIGINALISM 
Originalism is a variety of constitutional interpretation that comes in 
different flavors, some of which—if plausible—would be far more 
constraining on interpretive judgment than others.  After all, everyone 
interpreting the Constitution is, in some sense, an originalist.  Constitutional 
arguments are invariably tethered to some textual hook and defended as 
somehow consistent with the values underlying the text taken at an 
appropriate level of generality.12  Enthusiasts of a hard unitary executive, 
however, most frequently link their interpretation to one or another form of 
originalism that is taken to be genuinely constraining.  Indeed, judicial 
constraint is widely taken to be originalism’s central value.13  Old 
originalism, which might also be called intent-based originalism, seeks to 
find behind the constitutional text the founding generation’s expectations 
for the application of that text.  Perhaps the most glaring example of intent-
based originalism in the Supreme Court is its reading of the Eleventh 
 
 12 See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011) (offering a view of the 
Constitution “as an initial framework for governance that sets politics in motion, and that 
Americans must fill out over time through constitutional construction”); Thomas B. 
Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009) (arguing that while 
originalists agree on the importance of looking to the text, how to operationalize the text 
has been a point of disagreement). 
 13 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 46–47 
(1997) (arguing that originalism precludes the use of evolving standards in constitutional 
interpretation).  To be “constrained” in constitutional interpretation, however, is not 
necessarily the same thing as being “restrained” in the exercise of judicial power to 
overcome the judgments of elected officials.  See Keith E. Whittington, The New 
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609 (2004) (explaining that defenders of the 
“new originalism” take constitutional fidelity, not judicial restraint, to be the normative 
value underpinning their methodology).  For an intellectual history of modern-day 
originalist theory, together with a supremely helpful analysis of disagreements within the 
“family” of originalist approaches, see Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional 
Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 456 (2013) (explaining that, while all versions of 
originalism share the ideas that constitutional meaning is fixed at the time of drafting 
and ratification and that this meaning should constrain political officials, originalist 
approaches may differ in many other respects). 
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Amendment.  In quite specific language,14 the Amendment does no more 
than renounce jurisdiction over cases brought against states in federal court 
by citizens of other states.  The Supreme Court has held, however, that the 
intent behind the Eleventh Amendment was to restore a tacit baseline 
understanding among the Framers concerning the states and sovereign 
immunity generally.15  In view of this imputed intent, the Court reads the 
Constitution as not authorizing suits brought against a state, whether by its 
own citizens or citizens of other states, and whether in state or federal 
court.16  The only exceptions would be suits brought under federal statutes 
enacted pursuant to congressional remedial powers added to the 
Constitution after the Eleventh Amendment was ratified.17 
Critics of old originalism have discussed at length the difficulty of 
finding a coherent collective intent behind a document, the legal status of 
which reflects not only the handiwork of its drafters, but also the 
expectations of the various state ratifying conventions.18  Old originalism has 
also been critiqued as ironically inconsistent with the founding generation’s 
preferred methods of interpretation.19 
Largely in response to these critiques, a new originalism has emerged, 
which purports to be linked to the so-called “original public meaning” of the 
relevant text.  Original public meaning is said to be the meaning of the text 
as it would have been understood by then-contemporary competent readers 
in the population at large, as evidenced by dictionaries or other indicators of 
 
 14 “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in 
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 15 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 722 (1999) (“The text and history of the Eleventh 
Amendment . . . suggest that Congress acted not to change but to restore the original 
constitutional design.”); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1890) (“[T]he cognizance 
of suits and actions unknown to the law . . . was not contemplated by the Constitution 
when establishing the judicial power of the United States . . . . The suability of a State 
without its consent was a thing unknown to the law.”). 
 16 See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 712 (holding that Congress’s authority under Article I does not 
encompass “the power to subject nonconsenting [s]tates to private suits for damages in 
state courts”); Hans, 134 U.S. at 20–21 (holding that a state’s own citizens may not bring 
suit against it in federal court without its consent). 
 17 See generally Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (allowing private causes of actions 
against states when the cause of action is enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 18 See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204, 214 (1980) (“Therefore, an intentionalist must necessarily use circumstantial 
evidence to educe acollective or general intent.”). 
 19 See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 885, 887 (1985) (explaining that originalism emerged as a form of interpreting the 
Constitution only during the administration of President John Adams). 
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popular usage.20  New originalism resonates with old originalism in that its 
advocates would insist that original public meaning is also the best evidence 
of intent.  But, in any event, to the extent there is an ascertainable original 
public meaning, that meaning would presumably be what people voting on 
ratification thought they were voting for or against.21 
Applying this—or actually, any—interpretive method to the unitary 
executive debate is complicated in some easy-to-overlook ways.  First, in 
asking whether the Vesting Clause mandates a hard version of the unitary 
executive, we are asking what that clause implies in answer to two questions: 
Does the President have a constitutionally mandated power to remove at will 
any and all officers of the executive branch?  And does the President have 
constitutionally vested authority to effectively carry out all statutory law 
himself by dictating how every other officer in the executive branch 
exercises his or her legally vested discretion?  These are not questions that 
can be resolved simply by ascertaining the literal or semantic meaning of the 
words that the clause uses.  It is a safe bet that no dictionary definition of 
“executive power,” either in the 1780s or now, will define “executive power” 
in a sufficiently unambiguous way to yield a determinate answer to the 
question of the Vesting Clause’s legal effects.  What we are searching for 
might better be described as a “construction” of the clause—that is, a 
resolution of any vagueness or ambiguity in the text’s semantic meaning by 
resort to evidence other than the words’ acontextual communicative 
content.22 
 
 20 “[T]he new originalism is focused less on the concrete intentions of individual drafters of 
constitutional text than on the public meaning of the text that was adopted.”  
Whittington, supra note 13, at 609.  Prominent judicial examples of what purports to be 
the method at work include District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and NLRB v. 
Noel Canning, Co., 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2592–618 (2014) (Scalia, J. concurring). 
 21 A fascinating complication has been introduced into the scholarly debate over new 
originalism by evidence that a substantial number of voters in New York and Pennsylvania 
were informed largely by versions of the Constitution that appeared in Dutch and 
German translations, respectively.  This introduces the prospect that, in important ways, 
English-speaking and non-English-speaking voters during the ratification period may well 
have understood the Constitution differently.  See generally Christina Mulligan et al., 
Founding-Era Translations of the U.S. Constitution, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2016) (using 
translations of the Constitution made at the founding to derive the meaning of the text as 
understood by the translators). 
 22 On the relationship between interpretation and construction, see generally Solum, supra 
note 13 (explaining that the indeterminacy of the constitutional text frequently requires 
other interpretive tools besides strict construction, in which  the plain meaning of the 
text is simply translated).  Professor Solum argues that “construction is ubiquitous—
constitutional practitioners always engage in constitutional construction when they apply 
the constitutional text to particular cases or problems. . . . [T]he construction zone is 
ineliminable; there is no convincing argument that any plausible approach to 
constitutional interpretation will eliminate the underdetermination of constitutional 
practice by squeezing more communicative content from the constitutional text.”  Id. at 
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Understanding the unitary executive debate in these terms, however, 
highlights what Richard Fallon has identified as an ambiguity in what 
scholars mean when they purport to identify “original public meaning.”23  He 
persuasively shows how “legal meaning” might be understood in at least half 
a dozen different ways, so that debates over interpretation can rest on 
disagreement over which form of legal meaning counts and what the 
relevant evidence shows once we have alighted on the right meaning of 
“original meaning.”  Of the “meaning[s] of legal ‘meaning’” that Professor 
Fallon identifies, one seems most apt in capturing what “new originalism” 
defenders of the unitary executive are arguing.  That is, new originalists are 
arguing for a construction of Article II that treats the “unitary executive” as 
equivalent to the “[c]ontextual meaning [of the Vesting Clause] as framed 
by the shared presuppositions of speakers and listeners, including shared 
presuppositions about application and nonapplication.”24  This coincides 
with Professor Lawrence Solum’s statement of the “Public Meaning Thesis,” 
namely, “that the communicative content of the constitutional text is 
determined by the semantic meaning of the text as enriched by the publicly 
available context of constitutional communication.”25 
Merely identifying old and new originalism, however, still leaves 
unanswered many important questions about originalist interpretation.  
Some questions have to do with the plausibility of the method26 and some 
 
495.  Experience, as well as the force of Professor Solum’s logic, persuades me that his 
position is correct. 
 23 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of 
Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2015) (emphasis added) (critiquing 
textualism and originalism as unable to make consistent, categorical selections among 
possible referents for claims of legal meaning). 
 24 Fallon, supra note 23, at 1246. 
 25 Solum, supra note 13, at 474.  I suspect that Professor Solum would object to my 
formulation as conflating his important distinction between “interpretation” and 
“construction”; his statement of the “Plain Meaning Thesis” is, within his framework, a 
statement about what the words convey (interpretation), not about the determination of 
their legal effect (construction).  But when defenders of the unitary executive thesis 
argue from the original public meaning of Article II, their arguments are most readily 
understood as equating the “communicative content” of Article II—which Professor 
Solum links to its semantic content—with Article II’s proper “construction.”  Indeed, 
following Professor Solum, “original public meaning” originalism might better be called 
“original public construction” originalism.  See Solum, supra note 13, at 457 (defining 
constitutional construction as “the activity that determines the content of the 
constitutional doctrine and the legal effect of the constitutional text”).  I believe, 
however, or at least hope, that my restatement of the new originalist argument for the 
unitary executive captures in at least a relatively clear and intuitively appealing way the 
strategy of that argument. 
 26 See generally Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original Public Meaning, 31 CONST. 
COMMENT. 71 (2016) (putting forth six different ways original public meaning could be 
understood). 
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with its normative underpinnings.  That is, even if it were possible to identify 
founding intent or original public meaning, it would still be debatable why 
either should govern contemporary application of the Constitution.  And, of 
course, once one makes the move from interpretation to construction, one’s 
approach to constitutional construction would also have to be normatively 
justified. 
For present purposes, this Article will not pursue in further depth either 
the plausibility of, or normative questions surrounding old or new 
originalism, but, in a sense, take each method as commonly understood.  I 
shall accept that a coherent search for original public meaning is possible 
and can sometimes identify communicative content that is not, to use 
another phrase of Professor Solum’s, “vague, ambiguous, gappy, or 
contradictory.”27  What history shows, however, is that the semantic meaning 
of Article II’s Executive Power Vesting Clause is at least the first two of those 
things, and that the original construction of executive power vesting clauses 
did not attribute to them the unitary executive as the original construction. 
II.  PUBLIC MEANING ORIGINALISM AND THE EARLY STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 
An original public meaning strategy for imputing a mandatory unitary 
executive to Article II has to demonstrate that, in creating our separation of 
powers system, the founding generation would necessarily have inferred 
from the Constitution’s contextual meaning that a unitary executive is a 
necessary corollary to the separation of powers.  It might appear that the 
threshold issue for such an approach would be identifying the words of the 
Constitution that are relevant to the inquiry.  Should we seek, for example, 
the semantic meaning of the “vest[ing] of executive power?”  Or is our 
appropriate focus the original meaning of the vesting of executive power, 
when combined with an explicit obligation to “take care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed,” or perhaps when combined with both the faithful 
execution obligation and the right to demand the opinions in writing of 
heads of executive departments?28  As it turns out, however, we need not 
settle on a single focus because the early constitutions, with or without these 
 
 27 Lawrence Solum, Semantic and Normative Originalism: Comments on Brian Leiter’s “Justifying 
Originalism,” LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Oct. 30, 2007, 1:30 AM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/ 
legaltheory/2007/10/semantic-and-no.html; see also Solum, supra note 13, at 469–70 (“A 
text is ambiguous if it can have more than one meaning . . . .  The words ‘ambiguity’ and 
‘vagueness’ are sometimes used interchangeably, but I am now referring to ‘vagueness’ in 
the technical (or more precise) sense in which it refers to expressions that have 
borderline cases.”). 
 28  U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.  
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additional clauses, demonstrate that the unitary executive model was not the 
original construction of the vesting of executive power in a chief executive.29 
For evidence of what these clauses meant to late eighteenth century 
readers, I take as my evidence a set of early state constitutions roughly 
contemporaneous with the Philadelphia draft.  As I said earlier, one is 
unlikely to find in any dictionary—then or now—a definition of “executive 
power” that encompasses precisely what hard unitary executive advocates 
claim.  One does find the definition in Samuel Johnson’s dictionary, “having 
the power to put in act the laws.”30  Such a formulation, however, leaves 
ambiguous the key questions surrounding unitary executive theory, namely, 
does the Chief Executive have comprehensive removal authority over all 
subordinate administrators, and may the Chief Executive command those 
administrators in their exercise of any discretion that the law gives them with 
regard to government action? 
 
 29 To be clear, my position does not deny that the President enjoys some degree of 
constitutionally-based supervisory authority over subordinate officers.  To the extent 
subordinate officers help in implementing specific powers vested in the President by the 
Constitution, the argument is strong that the President’s powers of control over such 
officers must be complete.  For example, Professor Prakash and I would no doubt agree 
that the Secretary of State could not be protected from at-will discharge.  Likewise, I 
assume the President must have complete control over the policy judgments entailed in 
the implementation of any congressional authority to negotiate, for example, an 
international trade deal.  Further, even dissenters from the unitary executive thesis would 
concur that the President’s faithful execution obligation, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, requires 
that presidents have authority to dismiss administrative officers for dereliction of duty.  
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988) (“[W]e [do not] think that the ‘good 
cause’ removal provision at issue here impermissibly burdens the President’s power to 
control or supervise the independent counsel, as an executive official, in the execution of 
his or her duties under the Act.  This is not a case in which the power to remove an 
executive official has been completely stripped from the President, thus providing no 
means for the President to ensure the ‘faithful execution’ of the laws.”). 
  My interpretive inferences are these: The Constitution does not guarantee the President 
complete policy control over the implementation of statutes that do not directly implicate 
his specific Article II powers.  Because the Constitution, for example, gives the President 
no authority over the economy, it is up to Congress how far the President may personally 
be involved in controlling those administrators who implement statutes that Congress 
enacts pursuant to its power to regulate commerce.  The President undoubtedly has 
entitlements to information, pursuant to the Opinions Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, CL. 
1, and presumably some powers of coordination under the Vesting Clause.  But whether 
(a) presidents may personally exercise the functions Congress has vested in this class of 
administrators, (b) command how such administrators exercise their policy discretion, or 
(c) remove such administrators solely on grounds of policy preference, are matters 
subject to congressional determination.  These inferences are derived, however, not only 
or even primarily from text, but rather from arguments rooted in institutional structures 
and relationships and a general normative commitment to checks and balances.  SHANE, 
supra note 2, at 5–6 (defending checks and balances). 
 30 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 7, at 580 (quoting 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 684 (4th ed. 1773)). 
336 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:2 
 
Dictionaries, at least in this instance, are hardly the best, much less an 
exclusive source of interpretive guidance on questions such as these, which 
really go to a text’s legal effect or operational consequences.  A common 
popular understanding of the significance of words in operation is most 
likely to arise when the language at issue is in common use, and people can 
observe in action the significance of the text in question.  A common 
hypothetical posed to students of statutory interpretation is whether a sign 
banning “vehicles” in a park should be read as a bar to bicycle riding.  If, in 
any particular city, one observes that bicycle riding is common in parks 
bearing such signs, one would likely conclude that, within such an 
interpretive community, “vehicle” in the specific context of park signage 
does not connote “bicycle,” irrespective of contemporary dictionaries.  As it 
happens, because language nearly identical to the federal Constitution 
appears regularly in contemporaneous state constitutions, we can readily 
investigate whether those documents and government practice under them 
reveal what Americans who read the relevant clauses took them to imply.  
The Supreme Court, when it pursues original public meaning, looks to state 
constitutions for just such evidence.31 
Of course, any examination of the early state constitutions has to begin 
by identifying the relevant documents.  There is no fixed time frame within 
which semantic understandings and their legal implications remain 
relatively stable.  For reasons of both plausibility and manageability, I have 
thus focused on states admitted to the Union within fifteen years of the 
drafting of the federal Constitution—in other words, by 1802.  Then, even 
though the United States comprised seventeen individual states by 1802, I 
excluded Rhode Island.  Rhode Island famously operated under its 
seventeenth century charter until 1842,32 and documents drafted so remotely 
from 1789 might not be trustworthy indicators of 1787–1789 meaning.  For 
the remaining sixteen states, I focused on the state constitutions drafted 
most closely in time to the federal Constitution, except for six states that did 
not draft post-Confederation Period constitutions until well into the 
nineteenth century, if at all (Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
North Carolina, and Virginia).33  For those states, I included whichever of 
their Confederation Period constitutions was drafted most closely to 1787.  
 
 31 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 600–01 (2008) (“Our interpretation 
is confirmed by analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and 
immediately followed adoption of the Second Amendment.”). 
 32 Maureen McKenna Goldberg, Rhode Island’s Unique Constitutional History, 72 ALB. L. REV. 
601, 602 (2009). 
 33 The constitutional texts on which I relied appear in 1-7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, 
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA  (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909). 
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The one state for which this strategy did not yield a text drafted within 
thirteen years of federal ratification is Connecticut, which continued to 
operate throughout the Confederation and early national periods under its 
1662 Charter.34  Its organic document closest in time to 1787 was its 1818 
Constitution, which I did include in my sample.  Here is the list of 






MARYLAND 1776 (NEXT CONSTITUTION = 1851) 
MASSACHUSETTS 1780 (STILL IN OPERATION)
NEW HAMPSHIRE 1792
NEW JERSEY 1776 (NEXT CONSTITUTION = 1844) 
NEW YORK 1777 (NEXT CONSTITUTION = 1821) 






VIRGINIA 1776 (NEXT CONSTITUTION = 1830) 
 
Including state institutions in the analysis from both before and after 
1787 would seem to be a good thing from a public meaning point of view.  
To the extent the federal Constitution employs language similar to its 
forebears, we may infer that the Philadelphia drafters understood their 
words to have similar import.  To the extent post-Philadelphia state 
constitutions use language similar to the federal Constitution, we can draw 
inferences by looking at those state constitutions as to how the states 
interpreted the words of the federal Constitution’s Article II.  All in all, if 
state constitutions consistently vest “executive power” in a governor, both 
before and after 1787, and if the original public meaning of “executive 
power” included unitary policy control over discretionary executive 
functions, one would expect to find such functions located reliably within 
governor-headed hierarchies in the states.  One would also expect such 
 
 34 For an intriguing account of the debates that continued reliance on the Charter 
engendered in Connecticut between independence and the ultimate calling of a 
constitutional convention in 1818, see J. HAMMOND TRUMBULL, HISTORICAL NOTES ON 
THE CONSTITUTIONS OF CONNECTICUT 1639–1818 (Hartford, Brown & Gross 1873). 
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functions to be primarily accountable to the governor in the ordinary 
working of state administration.  On the other hand, if state constitutions 
consistently vest “executive power” in a governor, both before and after 
1787, but remove areas of public administration from gubernatorial control 
(or allow state legislatures to do so), then we would likely conclude that the 
vesting of executive power in a chief executive was not understood to entail 
a hard version of a unitary executive.  The latter pattern is the one that the 
early documents reveal, both before and after 1787. 
In fact, despite executive power vesting clauses, each of the sixteen 
constitutions in the sample contemplates either a mandatory or permissive 
legislative role in the appointment of officials involved in public 
administration.  In Connecticut, the state’s treasurer and secretary were 
elected officials; the legislature appointed the state’s comptroller and 
sheriffs.35  In Delaware, the state’s treasurer was appointed by the legislature; 
the constitution reserved power to the legislature to prescribe methods of 
appointment for “[a]ttorneys at law, all inferior officers in the treasury 
department, election officers, officers relating to taxes, to the poor, and to 
highways, constables and hundred officers . . . .”36  Georgia’s constitution 
provided for gubernatorial appointments of militia officers, secretaries of 
the governor, and such inferior officers as the legislature might permit the 
governor to appoint; by implication, all principal officers would be 
appointed by the legislature.37 
The state legislatures of Kentucky, Maryland, and Pennsylvania 
appointed those states’ treasurers.38  In New Jersey, a legislative council and 
the general assembly together appointed the attorney-general, secretary, and 
treasurer.39  The South Carolina General Assembly appointed 
“commissioners of the treasury, secretary of the State, and surveyor-
general.”40  The legislature of Massachusetts appointed the “Secretary, 
Treasurer, and Receiver-General, and the Commissary-General, Notaries 
public, and Naval-Officers.”41  In New Hampshire, likewise, the legislature 
selected the “secretary, treasurer, and commissary-general.”42  Moreover, the 
governor shared his appointments powers with regard to other officers with 
a popularly-elected five-member council, which could veto his 
 
 35 CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. IV, §§ 17–20. 
 36 DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. VIII, §§ 3, 6. 
 37 GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 2. 
 38 KY. CONST. of 1792, art. VI, § 7; MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XIII; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. VI, 
§ 5. 
 39 N.J. CONST. of 1776, para. XII. 
 40 S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. VI, § 1. 
 41 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. II, § 4, art. I. 
 42 N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt. Second, § LXVII. 
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appointments.43  In New York, the legislature appointed the treasurer,44 and 
the governor shared his appointment power with a council of four 
Senators.45  The North Carolina legislature appointed both that state’s 
Attorney General and its Treasurer.46  The Ohio legislature appointed the 
secretary of state, the treasurer, and the auditor.47  The Virginia legislature 
appointed the state’s attorney general, secretary, and treasurer.48  In 
Tennessee, the Governor was assigned appointment authority with regard to 
the adjutant-general of the militia, but the 1796 Constitution provided that 
“[t]he appointment of all Officers, not otherwise directed by this 
Constitution, shall be vested in the Legislature.”49  Vermont’s constitution 
did not explicitly vest appointment power over administrators to anyone 
other than the governor and his council.  It envisioned, however, that the 
legislature could itself decide to vest appointment power elsewhere.  The 
constitution vests the power of appointment in the governor and his council 
for all “Officers, except where provision is, or shall be otherwise made, by 
law or this Frame of Government.”50  As described below, the Vermont 
legislature proceeded to exercise such authority in a constitutionally 
interesting way.51 
This pattern is all the more striking because, in ten of these states, the 
constitutions explicitly and without qualification vested the “executive 
power” or the “supreme executive power” of the state in a governor.52  
Presumably, the Massachusetts and New Hampshire constitutions were to 
the same effect, although, rather than vesting executive power, they 
denominated their governors to be “the supreme Executive Magistrate.”53  In 
Virginia, the Governor exercised “the executive powers of government,” but 
with the advice of a Council of State.54  The Maryland and North Carolina 
constitutions provided that their governors could exercise “the executive 
 
 43 Id. §§ XLVI-XLVII. 
 44 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXII. 
 45 Id. art. XXIII. 
 46 N.C. CONST. of 1776, arts. XIII, XXII. 
 47 OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. II, § 16; id. art. VI, § 2. 
 48 VA. CONST. of 1776, paras. 35, 40. 
 49 TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. VII, § 5; id. art. VI, § 3. 
 50 VT. CONST. of 1793, chap. II, § 11. 
 51 See infra notes 100–103and accompanying text. 
 52 CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. IV, § 1; DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1789, 
art. XIX; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. II, § 1; N.J. CONST. of 1776, § VIII; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, 
art. XVII ; OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. II, § 1; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 1; S.C. CONST. of 
1790, art. II, § 1; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. II, § 1; VT. CONST. of 1792, ch. 2, § 3. 
 53 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. I; N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt. Second, § XLI. 
 54 VA. CONST. of 1776, para. 29. 
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powers of government,” but noted that those powers could be limited by the 
constitution or were to be exercised “according to the laws of [the] State.”55 
Yet even those state constitutions that arguably vested executive authority 
with some linguistic ambiguity offer no solace to proponents of a hard 
unitary executive reading of the federal Constitution.  That is because these 
are also five of the early constitutions in the sample that include explicit 
commitments to the separation of powers that are actually stronger and 
more categorical than any text in the federal constitution.  Both Maryland 
and North Carolina accompanied their 1776 state charters with Declarations 
of Rights that, in nearly identical terms, affirmed “[t]hat the legislative, 
executive and supreme judicial powers of government, ought to be forever 
separate and distinct from each other.”56  The 1776 Virginia Bill of Rights 
likewise provided that “the legislative and executive powers of the State 
should be separate and distinct from the judicative . . . .”57  Likewise, 
according to the Constitution of Massachusetts:  
In the government of this [c]ommonwealth, the legislative department shall never 
exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; [t]he executive shall 
never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; [t]he judicial 
shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the 
end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
58
   
Most elaborately, New Hampshire provided:  
In the government of this State, the three essential powers thereof, to wit, the 
[l]egislative, [e]xecutive, and [j]udicial, ought to be kept as separate from, and 
independent of each other, as the nature of a free government will admit, or as is 
consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the 
[c]onstitution in one indissoluble bond of union and amity.
59
   
It would seem anomalous to treat the non-conforming appointments in 
these states as evidence of a lesser commitment to the drafters’ own 
conceptions of the separation of powers, when each of these states declared 
its commitment to the separation of powers so emphatically—at least if we 
are taking seriously the idea of “original public meaning.” 
That non-conforming appointments are sanctioned in sixteen state 
constitutions that vested executive power in a governor—often reinforced by 
explicit commitments to the separation of powers—would seem to devastate 
the thesis that the vesting of executive power is enough, by virtue of original 
public meaning, to assure the Chief Executive unitary policy control over all 
public administration.  It remains to be considered, however, whether the 
federal Constitution might be semantically distinct, however, because it 
 
 55 MD. CONST. of 1776, para. XXXIII; N.C. CONST. of 1776, para. XIX. 
 56 N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, para. IV ; MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of 
Rights, para. VI (using the same language as the North Carolina constitution, with the 
exception of the word “supreme”). 
 57 VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 5. 
 58 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XXX. 
 59 N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt.1, art. XXXVII. 
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contains two other provisions that arguably yoke public administration to 
the President personally.  One is the requirement that the President “take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”60  The other is that he “may 
require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the 
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their 
respective Offices.”61 
These inquiries, however, do not buttress the unitary executive thesis.  
Governors in nine states are explicitly required to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.62  In those states, it is obvious that the presence of an 
express faithful execution obligation was not thought inconsistent with 
giving state legislatures powers of appointment with regard to important civil 
officers.  It is arguable, moreover, that this figure understates the irrelevance 
of faithful execution clauses to the unitary executive.  That is because it is 
unclear historically whether faithful execution clauses were intended as 
sources of executive authority or rather merely as prohibitions against the 
executive suspension of statutes.63  If the latter reading of such clauses is 
 
 60 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 61 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 62 CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. IV, § 9; DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 13; KY. CONST. of 1792, 
art. II, § 14; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIX; OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. II, § 7; PA. CONST. 
of 1790, art. II, § 13; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 8; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. II, § 10; 
VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. II, § 11. 
 63 Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive 
Power, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59, 90 (1983) (“[T]he Framers probably included the ‘faithful 
execution’ clause in the Constitution to limit, not expand, the President’s power.”).  
Professor Prakash has an unusual argument as to why, contrary to a common scholarly 
view, the Faithful Execution Clause would not have been understood as a ban on the 
suspension of statutes.  He points out that the English Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2 
(Eng.), which barred the royal suspension of statutes, was enacted in 1689.  Yet the 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1682 already provided: “That the Governor and provincial 
Council shall take care, that all laws, statutes and ordinances, which shall at any time be 
made within the said province, be duly and diligently executed.”  FRAME OF THE 
GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, art. VIII (1682).  A 1682 colonial constitution obviously 
could not have been derived from a 1689 parliamentary enactment.  PRAKASH, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE, supra note 5, at 93.  If the Pennsylvania 
Constitution were the model for Article II’s Faithful Execution Clause, then Article II 
would also not have roots in the English Bill of Rights. 
  The problem with this argument is that a number of state constitutions were written 
much closer in time to 1787, e.g., N.Y. CONST. of 1777, and they contained faithful 
execution clauses, e.g., id. cl. XIX, that were at least as likely to be on drafters’ minds in 
1787 as models for Article II.  It is dubious to assume that drafters of constitutions written 
in the 1770s would have understood the requirement of faithful execution to mean no 
more and no less than it meant in 1682, notwithstanding the momentous developments 
of 1689, which were of undoubted import to the colonists in understanding their liberties 
as British subjects.  Even without critically important intervening events, the passage of 
time can alter what language signifies.  When Thomas Jefferson spoke of the “pursuit of 
happiness” in 1776, he probably meant something like the pursuit of excellence and a 
virtuous life.  Carol V. Hamilton, Why Did Jefferson Change “Property” to the “Pursuit of 
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correct, it is notable that the four of the state constitutions that vest 
administrative appointments in authorities other than the governor but omit 
faithful execution clauses nonetheless expressly prohibit the executive 
suspension of statutes.64  Under this view of faithful execution, thirteen of 
the sixteen constitutions not only vest executive power in a governor, but 
also impose a faithful execution obligation or its equivalent.  There is little 
here to buttress the notion that drafters of state constitutions equate the 
vesting of executive power and the obligation of faithful execution of the 
laws with hierarchical control of public administration directed solely by the 
governor. 
Nor does the picture change if we look at constitutions that entitle 
governors to demand reports from other administrators.  From my sample, it 
appears as if the federal Opinions Clause may have been a new invention.  
None of the six Confederation Period state constitutions in my sample has 
its equivalent.  Of the ten post-Philadelphia constitutions, drafters of which 
might have consulted the federal text as an example, seven of these do 
include equivalent provisions.65  The only difference is that each of these 
texts, instead of entitling the respective governors to “opinions” in writing, 
allows the governors to demand “information” in writing.  All in all, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee provide seven examples of state constitutions roughly 
contemporaneous with, but drafted later than, the federal Constitution that 
all conjoin executive vesting clauses, faithful execution clauses, and the 
equivalent of the federal Opinions Clause.  Yet each of these state 
 
Happiness”? HISTORY NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 27, 2008), http://new.hnn.us/article/46460.  
When twenty-first century politicians speak of the “pursuit of happiness,” they presumably 
mean something quite different, even in quoting Jefferson. 
  Nor is it especially revealing that a state constitution might contain both a faithful 
execution obligation and a ban on suspending statutes. VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, art. XI; 
id. ch. I, art. XVII.  Constitutions are sometimes simply redundant.  Cf. PRAKASH, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE, supra note 5, at 193 (acknowledging that the 
Opinions Clause is seemingly superfluous given the Executive Power Vesting Clause).  
Indeed, if the Faithful Execution Clause is, as Professor Prakash suggests, not a ban on 
the suspension of statutes, but an affirmative grant of authority to the President to 
execute the law, the Faithful Execution Clause would seem to be a mere reiteration of the 
meaning Professor Prakash already ascribes to the Executive Power Vesting Clause.  
Moreover, even if the Vesting Clause did not already imply a requirement of fidelity to 
law, which seems doubtful, the presidential oath to “faithfully execute the Office of 
President of the United States” would seem to have fully covered the point.  U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 1. 
 64 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. First, art. XX; N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt. I, art. XXIX; N.C. 
CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. V; VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § VII. 
 65 CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. IV, § 6; DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 10; KY. CONST. of 1792, 
art. II, § 11; OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. II, § 7; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 10; S.C. 
CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 11; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. II, § 8. 
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constitutions expressly assigns to the legislative branch at least some of the 
appointing power with regard to significant administrative officers.66 
 
 66 Not much is added to this analysis by an inquiry into gubernatorial removal powers.  The 
federal Constitution, of course, makes no mention of presidential removal power.  This is 
the pattern of most state constitutions as well, except insofar as they authorize 
gubernatorial removals of judicial or militia officers on address by two-thirds of a few of 
the state legislatures.  In Delaware, the attorney general was subject to such removal by 
address, but that constitution clearly implies that the attorney general is part of the 
judiciary; that official is grouped, with regard to removal susceptibility, with “clerks of the 
supreme court, prothonotaries, registers, clerks of the orphans’ courts and of the peace,” 
all of whom are part of the judicial branch of government.  DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. VIII, 
§ 5.  The only constitutions that explicitly contemplate a general gubernatorial removal 
power are those of Maryland and Vermont.  In Maryland, the Governor could “suspend 
or remove any civil officer who has not a commission during good behavior,” with the 
approval of the Governor’s Council, both the Governor and his Council having been 
elected by the legislature.  MD. CONST. of 1776, para. XLVIII.  Vermont’s constitution 
provided that “[e]very officer of state, whether judicial or executive, shall be liable to be 
impeached by the General Assembly, either when in office, or after his resignation or 
removal for mal-administration.”  VT. CONST. of 1793, Ch. II, § 24.  Uniquely, it went on 
to prove that “[a]ll impeachments shall be before the Governor, or Lieutenant Governor, 
and Council . . . .”  Id.  In every other state, impeachment was the prerogative of the 
legislature. 
  Although what these texts imply for a governor’s authority to remove officers—and thus, 
perhaps, to supervise their exercise of discretionary functions—is not entirely clear, the 
implications seem to disfavor the unitary executive idea.  For example, federal courts 
have long assumed that, in the absence of any implicit or explicit statutory constraint on 
the President, the President’s power of removal would be incidental to the power of 
appointment.  Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 259 (1839) (“In the absence of all 
constitutional provision, or statutory regulation, it would seem to be a sound and 
necessary rule, to consider the power of removal as incident to the power of 
appointment.”).  If that is so, it would seem to follow that, where state constitutions vested 
appointment authority in state legislators, they and only they would likewise have the 
power of removal.  Any gubernatorial authority over such officers would be limited to 
what the respective constitutions might have provided or what the relevant legislatures 
might have authorized by statute. 
  Some state statutes were a bit more detailed about official accountability to the 
legislature.  Kentucky, as noted above, was one of the states in which the legislature chose 
the treasurer.  That official, in turn, reported directly to a committee appointed by the 
legislature.  An early statute provided that the Kentucky treasurer “forfeit[ed] his office” 
if he misapplied any funds, presumably upon a resolution of the legislature to that effect.  
Acts of the General Assembly of Ky., Jan. Sess. 1798, ch. LXV, §§ 11–12.  The Kentucky 
Constitution contained no provision for the removal of delinquent officers by the 
governor.  The South Carolina Constitution of 1790 carried forward the provisions of the 
state’s 1778 Constitution providing for the legislative appointment of the “commissioners 
of the Treasury,” along with the attorney-general and other officers, subject to such 
future changes as the legislature might enact.  S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. VI, § 1; id. art. 
VII.  Not only does there appear to be no legal provision for the gubernatorial removal of 
the two state treasurers—one in Columbia and one in Charleston—but these officials had 
the duty to “instruct the attorney-general or solicitors, respectively, to 
prosecute . . . defaulters” among the state’s tax collectors.  Act of Dec. 19, 1801, 1801 S.C. 
ACTS 1, 12.  Thus, the supervision of tax collection—which we would today regard as 
quintessentially executive—was in the hands of officials who reported only to the 
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In sum, early state constitutions vested “executive power” in a governor, 
but did not assign all administrative officers to a governor-headed executive 
branch hierarchy.  Critical executive functions are assigned to officers who 
appear not to be accountable to state governors in the ordinary workings of 
public administration.  The most natural reading of these texts belies unitary 
executive theory as a matter of original public meaning.  As a theoretical 
matter, however, it is hypothetically possible that the evidence thus amassed 
might actually buttress, rather than undermine, a unitary reading of the 
federal Constitution.  The next Part of this Article explains—and refutes—
this argument. 
III.  ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE UNDER THE EARLY STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 
A counterargument to Part II’s reading of the early state constitutions 
could run as follows: The original public meaning of an Executive Power 
Vesting Clause, either alone or in combination with the Faithful Execution 
and Opinions Clauses, would have dictated a unitary executive 
interpretation in the late eighteenth century, unless qualified by other 
clauses.  The fact that all the early state constitutions provide expressly for 
the legislative appointment of various officers might demonstrate that, 
absent such explicit provisions, the state legislatures would have been 
required under original public meaning to acknowledge an exclusive 
appointment authority in the governor—as well as the removal and 
supervisory authorities for which unitary executive advocates argue.  Because 
the federal Constitution does not provide for the legislative appointment of 
various officers, it would follow, under this theory, that the unitary executive 
construction of that document is the right one.67 
 
legislature.  They, in turn, could “direct” the filing of suit, which we would today typically 
classify also as an executive function. 
  In sum, the early state constitutional texts pertaining explicitly to removal powers 
generally do not add anything to an original public meaning argument for a unitary 
executive in the states, but the topic is generally left to implication, as it is in the federal 
Constitution. 
 67 From our correspondence, I take this to be Professor Prakash’s position: 
The unitary executive claim is not that the vesting of executive power necessarily 
cedes control over the public administration of the law. . . . [C]onstitutions can 
modify that rule as by granting for cause removal constraints or by implying that 
those vested with executive power cannot direct.  The [unitary executive] claim is 
that the U.S. Constitution has no such constraints and that Congress cannot 
modify the President’s power to serve as “constitutional executor” of the law any 
more than it can modify the President’s pardon power. 
  Email from Saikrishna Prakash to Peter M. Shane (June 20, 2016, 10:43 EST) (on file with 
the author). 
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To be sure, even on its face, such an argument seems problematic.  One 
would have to accept, for example, that the drafters of a state constitution 
such as New Hampshire’s—which denominated the governor the “Supreme 
Executive Magistrate”68 and declared that the legislative and executive 
branches “ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each 
other, as the nature of a free government will admit”69—nonetheless 
understood that they were violating the separation of powers principle by 
permitting legislative appointment of the state’s “Secretary, Treasurer, and 
Commissary-General.”70  The argument requires us to infer that the drafters 
of New Hampshire’s constitution were self-consciously self-contradictory. 
The project of unitary executive originalism is even more conspicuously 
doomed, however, by a closer investigation of the administrative tasks state 
legislatures assigned outside gubernatorial control and how state legislatures 
understood their discretion in providing for the appointment of public 
administrators.  Such an investigation reveals that state legislatures 
frequently went beyond the express terms of state constitutions in assigning 
executive functions to persons outside executive control.  To the extent state 
constitutions gave legislatures specific roles in the appointment of officials 
involved in public administration, legislatures did not regard these grants of 
authority to be narrow exceptions to a general principle of unitary executive 
control.  They took them to be evidence of a different baseline principle, 
namely, legislative authority to design of the institutions of government and 
even to attenuate gubernatorial control over administration. 
To evaluate fully the evidence in this respect, it is important to note that 
the early state constitutions—though they all permit legislatures to choose 
one or more significant state officers—treat the subject of appointments in 
rather different ways, as documented in the Appendix below.  For example, 
the Georgia, Ohio, Tennessee, and Vermont constitutions all give their 
respective legislatures wide authority over the appointment of administrative 
officers.  Georgia reserves to the legislature the selection of nearly all 
principal state officers, while giving that body the authority also to permit 
inferior officers to be chosen by “the governor, the courts of justice, or in 
such other manner as they may by law establish.”71  The Ohio constitution 
allows generally for the appointment of civil officers not named in the 
constitution to “be made in such a manner as may be directed by law.”72  The 
Tennessee constitution vests appointment authority in the legislature for all 
 
 68 N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt. II, § XLI. 
 69 Id. pt. I, art. XXXVII. 
 70 Id. pt. II, § LXVII. 
 71 GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 2. 
 72 OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VI, § 4. 
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officers “not otherwise directed by [the] constitution.”73  The Vermont 
constitution also implies legislative authority to provide by law, at its 
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By way of contrast, the Massachusetts and New Hampshire constitutions 
specify certain officers to be appointed by their respective legislatures and 
yet other specific officers to be chosen by a governor and council.75  Yet 
 
 73 TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. VI, § 3. 
 74 VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. II, § 11.  It might be inferred that the North Carolina legislature 
had similarly broad authority to attenuate the governor’s supervision of public 
administration; that constitution allowed the governor to “exercise all the other executive 
powers of government, limited and restrained as by this Constitution is mentioned, and 
according to the laws of the State.”  N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX (emphasis added). 
75  MASS. CONST. of 1780, Ch. 2, § 1, Art. IX, and § 4, Art. I; N.H. CONST. of 1792, Part 
Second, §§ XLVI, XLVII. 
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neither makes any express provision for civil officers other than those 
named in the constitution. 
A third set of constitutions vests in state legislatures the appointment 
authority regarding specific state officers, while explicitly placing the 
residual appointment authority over all other offices in the governor.  
Examples include Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland (with consent of a 
council), New York (with consent of a council), Pennsylvania, and South 
Carolina.76  Yet a fourth group vests in state legislatures the appointment 
authority regarding specific state officers, but say nothing at all about the 
appointment of state civil officers not named in the constitution.  These 
include Connecticut, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Virginia.  The table 
above captures these groupings. 
Legislative decisions in the first group of states to attenuate the 
governor’s control over administration are less immediately on point for our 
inquiry because the constitutions in those states explicitly direct or at least 
permit the legislature to provide for administrative appointments outside 
the executive branch.  In other words, except in an interesting way discussed 
below, the fact that legislatures in these states took administrative authority 
out of gubernatorial hands might not reveal much about those legislatures’ 
understanding of separation of powers principles; they were mostly 
exercising powers that their constitutions explicitly conferred.  But—and 
this is definitely instructive—state legislatures in the other groups went 
beyond the explicit grants of legislative appointments power that their 
constitutions authorized and provided by statute for what I have called non-
conforming appointments, that is, appointments by authorities other than 
the governor of civil officers wielding what would seem today obviously to be 
executive power.  Examples exist even in states whose constitutions gave 
governors broad residual authority to make appointments to officers not 
covered by the constitution. 
For example, Massachusetts had one of the two constitutions that (1) 
specified certain officers to be appointed by its legislature and yet other 
specific officers by a governor and council, but (2) made no any express 
provision for civil officers other than those named in the constitution.  In 
1802, when the legislature wanted an authoritative determination of the 
boundary line between Massachusetts and Rhode Island, it appointed those 
commissioners by statute.77  The legislature did not treat gubernatorial 
appointment as an implicit mandatory default. 
 
76  DEL. CONST. of 1792, Art. II, § 8, Art. VIII, § 3, and Art. VIII, § 6; KY. CONST. of 1792, Art. 
II, § 8, and Art. VI, § 7; MD. CONST. of 1776, Arts. X, XIII, XLI, XLVIII; N.Y. CONST. of 
1777, Arts. XXII and XXIII ; PA. CONST. of 1790, Art. II, § VIII, Art. V, § V; S.C. CONST. of 
1790, Art. VI, §§ 1 and 2. 
 77 Act of Mar. 8, 1791, ch. 22, 1791 Mass. Acts 91. 
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The Connecticut, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Virginia constitutions 
say nothing at all about the appointment of civil officers other than those 
named by the constitution.  Yet the legislature of each enacted non-
conforming appointments.  For example, in 1784, Connecticut provided by 
statute for the appointment of state’s attorneys by the county courts.78  This 
practice persisted until at least 1854, notwithstanding the adoption of the 
new Constitution in 1818.79  As recounted earlier, the Connecticut 
Constitution of 1818 not only vested the executive power in the governor, 
but required the governor to take care that the laws be faithfully executed 
and gave the governor the equivalent of Opinions Clause authority.80  There 
was no provision in the 1818 article on the judiciary independently 
authorizing the judicial appointment of prosecutors. 
Connecticut’s practice of judicial appointments for prosecutors persisted 
in the face of a separation of powers system worded identically in relevant 
respects to the federal Constitution.  A North Carolina statute of 1777 
likewise empowered county courts to appoint additional prosecuting 
attorneys.81 
New Jersey, for its part, authorized the licensing of taverns and inns by 
“the courts of general quarter sessions of the peace.”82  It directly appointed 
“commissioners for laying out, opening and improving a road to 
accommodate travelers.”83  Connecticut likewise provided for the licensing 
of taverns by county Courts of Common Pleas,84 and the Virginia legislature 
also appointed road commissioners. 85  None of the legislatures in this group 
treated the specific provisions for non-conforming appointments in their 
constitutions to be exclusive, narrowly drawn exceptions from a legislative 
obligation to vest appointment authority in a governor. 
Perhaps, however, most telling in this respect is the existence of non-
conforming appointments even under state constitutions that appeared to 
 
 78 THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 10–11 (John D. Cushing ed., 1982). 
 79 A post-1854 statute appears to have reorganized the courts.  Subsequent references to the 
judicial appointment of prosecuting attorneys place the power with “superior” courts.  
CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 11, § 35 (1866).  Connecticut retained some form of judicial 
involvement in the appointment of state’s attorneys until 1985.  See 1985 Conn. Acts 1379 
§ 142 (repealing CONN. GEN. STAT ANN. tit. 51, § 51-278(a), and giving the power to 
appoint the chief state’s attorney to the criminal justice commission’s administrative 
head). 
 80 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 81 1 THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 311, § LXVIII (John D. Cushing ed., 
1984). 
 82 Act of Feb. 24, 1797, ch. 438, 1796 N.J. Laws 180. 
 83 Act of Mar. 10, 1795, ch. 535, 1794 N.J. Laws 1022; see also Act of Feb. 15, 1794, ch. 462, 
1793 N.J. Laws 891 (listing the appointments of multiple commissioners to lay out, open, 
and improve roads). 
 84 1792 Conn. Pub. Acts 437. 
 85 Act of Jan. 11, 1809, ch. 55, 1808 Va. Acts 61. 
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give their governors significant residual appointment authority with regard 
to civil officers.  Road commissioners were appointed directly by the 
legislatures of Delaware,86 Kentucky,87 Maryland,88 New York,89 and South 
Carolina.90  In creating central banks for their respective states, the 
legislatures of South Carolina and Kentucky were all but indifferent to 
executive oversight of those institutions.  The President and board of 
directors of the Bank of South Carolina were selected entirely by the 
legislature, and the Bank reported its account to the legislature.91  The 
enacting legislation placed a number of restrictions on the Bank’s 
operation, but made no provision for their enforcement by the governor.  
There was even less direct state control over the Bank of Kentucky, half the 
directors of which were elected by private stockholders and half by the 
legislature.92  The governor was permitted to inspect the Bank’s books 
whenever he so requested,93 but had no other direct legal authority over the 
institution.  In short, even under constitutions that envisioned broad 
appointing authority in the governor, legislatures still inferred they had the 
power to place certain administrative tasks in the hands of persons the 
governor did not appoint and control. 
As I said earlier, it is not surprising to find non-conforming 
appointments in states like Georgia, Ohio, Tennessee, or Vermont, given 
that their constitutions envision broad legislative authority over 
appointments.  But even they provide corroborating authority of a sort.  Of 
the four, only Tennessee required the legislature to appoint all officers not 
otherwise provided for in the state constitution.94  Georgia, Ohio, and 
Vermont could have restricted non-conforming appointments—for 
example, grants of appointment authority to the courts—to strictly judicial 
officers.  That would have shown a baseline commitment to an 
understanding of the separation of powers consistent in principle with 
unitary executive theory.  But no such pattern exists.  For example, 
notwithstanding Georgia’s explicit constitutional commitment to the 
separation of powers, county judges were authorized to appoint local 
 
 86 Act of Jan. 28, 1803, ch. 138, 1803 Del. Laws 301. 
 87 Act of Dec. 22, 1806, 1806 Ky. Acts 134. 
 88 Act of Dec. 30, 1791, ch. 82, 1791 Md.. 
 89 Act of Apr. 10, 1792, ch. 60, 1792 N.Y. Laws 360; Act of Apr. 9, 1804, ch. 96, 1804 N.Y 
Laws 530. 
 90 Act of Dec. 21, 1798, 1798 S.C. Acts 13. 
 91 Bank of the State of South Carolina Act, §§ 17, 63–64 (1812) in 1 AN ALPHABETICAL 
DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC STATUTE LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA 56, 58, 65 (Joseph Brevard ed., 
Charleston, John Hoff 1814). 
 92 Bank of Kentucky Act, § 8,  in 1 A DIGEST OF THE STATUTE LAW OF KENTUCKY 139, 140 
(William Littell & Jacob Swigert eds., Frankfort, Kendall & Russell 1822). 
 93 Id. 
 94  TN. CONST. of 1796, Art. VI, § 3rd.  
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tobacco inspectors.95  When new roads were to be opened or altered, the 
relevant Georgia statute empowered the courts to appoint three-person 
inspection teams to examine the grounds urged to be cleared or altered and 
report to the court.96  The legislature also inferred it had authority to vest 
administrative tasks unrelated to the adjudication of cases in the courts, not 
the state executive branch.  County courts had licensing and regulatory 
authority over taverns;97 clerks of county courts registered brands and 
marks;98 and county courts regulated roads (including the administration of 
applications to build new or amend existing roads).99  The Ohio legislature 
likewise assumed it could assign nonjudicial administrative functions to the 
courts, providing for the licensing by “the associate judges . . . of the proper 
county” of ferries, taverns, and stores selling “any merchandise other than 
the growth or manufacture of the United States.”100 
Like Georgia and Ohio, the Vermont legislature took advantage of its 
implicit authority to provide by statute for the non-gubernatorial 
appointment of officials, but did not limit those appointments to officials 
doing only non-executive tasks.  For example, the legislature itself appointed 
members of several committees to “lay out . . . public highway[s].”101  State’s 
attorneys—one in each county—were appointed by the legislature (and 
reappointed or replaced each legislative term).102  Not only did the state’s 
attorneys prosecute “all matters and causes” on behalf of the state, but they 
 
 95 Act of Feb. 2, 1798, in A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 683–84 (Robert 
Watkins & George Watkins eds., Philadelphia, R. Aitken 1800) [hereinafter DIGEST OF 
THE LAWS OF GEORGIA].  Lest it be objected that the statutory provisions in question were 
enacted prior to the 1798 Georgia constitution discussed in text, it should be recognized 
that the 1777 Georgia constitution likewise declared a separation of powers, GA. CONST. 
of 1777, art. I, and the 1789 Constitution vested executive power in the governor, GA. 
CONST. of 1798, art. II, § 1. 
 96 Act of Dec. 20, 1792 in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF GEORGIA, supra note 95, at 499.  Georgia’s 
system for road administration may not have been particularly effective, as the legislature 
repeatedly amended it.  See, e.g., Act of Feb. 4, 1789 in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF GEORGIA, 
supra note 95, at 386 (giving the superior courts full power and authority to order roads 
be built); Act of Dec. 19, 1818, 1818 Ga. Laws 401–02 (requiring justices of inferior courts 
to appoint three justices of the peace for erecting public roadways). 
 97 Act of Dec. 24, 1791 in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF GEORGIA, supra note 95, at 453–54.  This 
authority included fixing the price of liquor on a county-by-county basis. 
 98 Act of Dec. 8, 1792 in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF GEORGIA, supra note 95, at 456–57. 
 99 Act of Feb. 4, 1789 in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF GEORGIA, supra note 95, at 386; Act of Dec. 
20, 1792 in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF GEORGIA, supra note 95, at 499. 
100 Act of Feb. 1, 1805, ch. 8, 1804 Ohio Laws 96, 99.  The legislature later vested this 
authority in the “court of common pleas, of the proper county.” Act of Feb. 8, 1810, ch. 
34, § 1, 1809 Ohio Laws 107. 
101 Act of Oct. 27, 1795, 1795 Vt. Acts & Resolves 431. 
102 Act of Nov. 10, 1797, ch. 83, § 1, 1797 Vt. Acts & Resolves reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE 
STATE OF VERMONT OF A PUBLICK AND PERMANENT NATURE 556, 556 (Wm. Slade, Jr. ed., 
Windsor, Simeon Ide 1825). 
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were also empowered to enforce monetary penalties issued by state courts.103  
Although the state’s attorneys were appointed by the legislature, they were 
in some measure supervised by the courts, which certified the statements of 
accounts that state’s attorneys were required to submit to the treasurer, who 
in turn submitted them to the legislature.104 
One reaction to this evidence is that I might simply have identified a host 
of specific administrative tasks—surveying, financial management, civil and 
criminal prosecution, tavern licensing, road administration, tobacco 
inspection, and so on—that were not uniformly understood in the late 
eighteenth century as inherently executive in a constitutional sense.  But this 
reaction would not be a riposte; it would underscore my point.  The original 
public meaning of executive power was either vague, ambiguous, or both.  
The vesting of executive power—even the vesting of executive power 
coupled with faithful execution obligations and the right to demand 
information from subordinates—did not imply in virtually any of the states a 
constitutional entitlement of governors to supervise a unitary executive 
branch. 
Understandably, there was little early litigation over gubernatorial 
appointments and removals to shed further light on the states’ first-
generation understandings of their new constitutions.  A rather striking 
example, however, comes from Pennsylvania, the constitution of which 
provided: “[The governor] shall appoint all officers whose offices are 
established by this Constitution, or shall be established by law, and whose 
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for . . . .”105  An early 
Pennsylvania decision affirmed that the governor had the power to remove 
from office the inspector of salt provisions for the city of Philadelphia.106  
The court reached its conclusion after interpreting Congress’s Decision of 
1789 as an endorsement of presidential removal power under Article II, 
which it took to apply at least as powerfully under the Pennsylvania 
constitution to imply a gubernatorial removal power.  The court, however, 
explicitly recognized the legislature’s power to limit removal by statute: “As 
to the tenure of ministerial offices in general, there can be no doubt but it is 
during pleasure, unless the law by which the office is established, order it 




105 PA. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 8. 
106 Commonwealth ex rel. Reynolds v. Bussier, 5 Serg. & Rawle 451, 462 (Pa. 1820). 
107 Id. at 460–01 (emphasis added).  To be fair, this line, standing alone, might not imply a 
judicial understanding that the legislature could limit removability.  A statute with tenure 
“at pleasure” might have been read to imply an indefinite term, unlike statutes that might 
specify a specific term of years.  Yet even statutes with specific terms could have been 
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supreme court indicated that—notwithstanding the categorical language of 
the Pennsylvania constitution—the legislature could reserve the 
appointment of some administrative officials to itself or assign appointing 
authority to persons other than the governor.108 
In thus going beyond the express terms of state constitutions that 
authorized non-conforming appointments explicitly, legislatures (and 
apparently at least one court) did not regard these grants of authority to be 
narrow exceptions to a general principle of unitary executive control.  They 
regarded them as corroborating legislative powers to design the institutions 
of government and even to attenuate gubernatorial control over 
administration.  “Executing the law” appears to have meant something like 
“executing the law to the extent and in the manner prescribed by the 
legislature.”  Insofar as the state constitutions shed light on the original 
public meaning of the language of Article II, they show that a proper 
construction of the relevant words did not connote a constitutional 
command for a unitary executive branch.109 
IV.  OLD ORIGINALISM: THE CASE OF THE NATIONAL BANK 
Prior to the advent of the “original public meaning” version of 
constitutional originalism, the theory of the hard unitary executive was 
typically advanced on original intent rather than semantic grounds.  Indeed, 
the notion of “original public meaning” divorced from original intent has 
not gone unchallenged among originalists.110  Early federal administrative 
practice, however—the kinds of administrative practice I have explored in 
 
understood at that time to leave the power of executive removal at will intact.  I am 
grateful to Professor Prakash for pointing out the ambiguity. 
108 Commonwealth ex rel. Lehman v. Sutherland, 3 Serg. & Rawle 145, 149 (Pa. 1817) 
(“[T]here are matters of temporary and local concern, which, although comprehended 
in the term office, have not been thought to be embraced by the constitution.  And when 
offices of that kind have been created, the legislature have sometimes made the 
appointment in the law which created them, sometimes given the appointment to others 
than the Governor, and sometimes given the power of removal to others, although the 
appointment was left to the Governor.”). 
109 I should also say that, in making this argument, I decided to forbear from relying on the 
many examples of state constitutions and statutes providing for the state legislative 
appointment of local administrative officers; such examples also betoken a fracturing of 
state administrative authority.  I have not pursued the point only because the varying 
practices with regard to the appointment of local officials might be thought to reveal the 
different state and federal understandings of the vertical dimensions of public 
administration, rather than different understandings of the separation of powers per se. 
110 See Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (2009) (“[R]examin[ing] the shift from the subjective intent of 
the constitution-makers to the ‘original public meaning’ of the Constitution’s words.”). 
Dec. 2016] THE ORIGINALIST MYTH 353 
 
Part III with regard to the states—has always been a problem for the 
unitarian version of original intent. 
The interpretive touchstone for intention-based originalists would 
presumably be evidence of authorial expectation for the application of the 
founding text.  There is inevitable ambiguity as to which authors count—the 
drafters or the ratifiers.  But we can at least imagine the possibility that the 
drafters’ text effectively communicated their intentions to the ratifiers or 
that, through speeches or supplementary texts, these intentions were 
conveyed accurately to voters whose affirmative ballots endorsed them.  In 
any event, it is no surprise that, among intention-based originalists, the 
debates and output of the First Congress enjoy a special pride of place.111  
Not only would that Congress be closest in time and thus most attuned to 
the contemporary meaning of the Philadelphia text, but many Members had 
actually helped draft the Constitution: eleven in the Senate (which 
comprised twenty-one to twenty-six Members, depending on vacancies and 
dates of election) and ten in the House, membership in which ranged from 
fifty-nine to sixty-five Members.112  Among the House Members was James 
Madison, who presumably would have been an authoritative source of 
intelligence about Framer intent.  This is a group whose behavior might be 
thought an accurate mirror of Framer/ratifier intentions. 
The problem for original intent unitarians is that the First Congress’s 
handiwork regarding the structure of the initial administrative departments 
seems to belie the idea that the Framers intended a hard version of a unitary 
executive.113  For example, although the President was given significant 
flexibility and control when it came to the new Departments of War and of 
 
111 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 136 (1926) (“We have devoted much space to this 
discussion and decision of the question of the presidential power of removal in the First 
Congress, not because a congressional conclusion on a constitutional issue is conclusive, 
but first because of our agreement with the reasons upon which it was avowedly based, 
second because this was the decision of the First Congress on a question of primary 
importance in the organization of the government made within two years after the 
Constitutional Convention and within a much shorter time after its ratification, and third 
because that Congress numbered among its leaders those who had been members of the 
convention.  It must necessarily constitute a precedent upon which many future laws 
supplying the machinery of the new government would be based and, if erroneous, would 
be likely to evoke dissent and departure in future Congresses.  It would come at once 
before the executive branch of the government for compliance and might well be 
brought before the judicial branch for a test of its validity.”). 
112 On the members of the First Congress, see 1st United States Congress, WIKIPEDIA (visited 
Sept. 23, 2016), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_United_States_Congress; Birth of the 
Nation: The First Federal Congress, 1789–1791: An Online Exhibit by the First Federal 
Congress Project, http://www.gwu.edu/~ffcp/exhibit/p1/members/. 
113 See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 293 (2012) (arguing that early 
notions of the unitary executive do not comport with twenty-first century proponents of 
unitary executive theory). 
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Foreign Affairs (which shortly became the Department of State), this was not 
so regarding the Treasury.114  The Attorney General had no department at 
all and questionable authority over the part-time U.S. Attorneys, who were 
affiliated loosely with the Department of State and who supported 
themselves largely through the private practice of law.115  Again, to quote the 
work of Jerry Mashaw: 
Congress created commissions and boards outside of any of the major 
departments to oversee the Mint, to buy back debt of the United States, 
and to rule on patent applications.  Because these commissions and 
boards were made up of already existing officers of the United States, 
Congress in effect appointed the officers by the same legislative act that 
created their offices.  From this perspective these were “independent 
commissions” in an even stronger sense than those we recognize today.  
Some of these ex-officio commissioners could be replaced by the 
President by replacing the officers.  But other Boards of Commissioners 
contained non-removable officials like the Chief Justice and the 
President of the Senate.116 
Congress’s eclecticism in fashioning different administrative structures with 
different lines of accountability to different sources of supervision could 
hardly have been more conspicuous. 
Another insufficiently-appreciated blow to the old originalist case for a 
hard unitary presidency is the First Bank of the United States.  Separation of 
powers theorists have largely ignored the Bank, presumably because, as a 
kind of public-private partnership, it so obviously does not fit comfortably 
within any traditional view of the administrative state.  Although she does 
not mention it specifically, the Bank seems to be an early example of the 
kind of “boundary” agency that Anne O’Connell shows has never been fully 
accounted for in administrative law scholarship.117 
 
114 Id. at 40. 
115 Id. at 43; see also Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of Justice: 
Professionalization Without Civil Rights or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 121, 131 (2014) 
(“Until 1854, each Attorney General maintained a substantial private practice, and many 
did not even live in Washington, D.C.  Until 1819, the Attorney General did not even 
have his own clerk, and until 1821, an office.”).  Professor Prakash has argued, however, 
that the records of early administrations show that Presidents Washington, Adams, and 
Jefferson all believed they were constitutionally entitled to direct the activities of district 
attorneys.  Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 553–63 
(2005).  Because Congress never purported to regulate presidential practices in this 
respect, this history does not substantiate that the Constitution guarantees the President a 
prosecution-directing role, only that—absent congressional limitation—Presidents 
thought they were not violating the law by ordering that prosecutions commence or 
desist, and none of the early Presidents’ directives was sufficiently controversial on the 
merits to arouse resistance. 
116 MASHAW, supra note 113, at 43–44. 
117 Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 914 (2014). 
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Yet there is no doubt the Bank wielded government power.  Professors 
Walter Dellinger and H. Jefferson Powell—at the time of their writing the 
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) 
and his former deputy, respectively—have observed that a modern-day OLC 
opinion on the constitutionality of a national bank would have focused 
immediately on possible separation of powers objections to the bill.118  The 
Bank may be inconvenient for originalist defenders of a unitary presidency, 
but it can hardly be ignored as irrelevant. 
As Professor Mashaw recounts, the Bank of the United States—strongly 
urged by Framer Alexander Hamilton and modeled after the Bank of 
England119—effectively regulated the money supply.  As Mashaw explains: 
  The statute authorizing the Bank provided a charter and specified 
the total capitalization of the enterprise.  It also provided voting rules for 
stockholders, limits on total debt and the amount of interest to be 
charged, and a limit on the subscription to be made to the Bank by the 
federal government.  But all of the Bank’s operating policies—including 
when and where to establish branches—were left to the regulations to be 
adopted by the Bank’s directors, only a minority of whom would be 
selected by the United States.120 
The precise degree of government influence in the selection of the 
directors of the First Bank of the United States is difficult to measure.  
Directors were to be chosen according to a plurality of shareholder votes, 
and the United States was limited to subscribing to no more than a fifth of 
the Bank’s stock.121  Although the number of votes given to each shareholder 
depended on a complex formula,122 the United States bloc was presumably 
large enough to be influential, although the statute was silent as to who 
would vote on behalf of the United States.  The government’s minority 
status was cemented, however, when the Bank was re-chartered in 1816.  
Under the Second Bank Bill,  the President was explicitly authorized to 
appoint five of the Bank’s directors, with the Senate’s advice and consent, 
 
118 Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill: The Attorney 
General’s First Constitutional Law Opinions, 44 DUKE L.J. 110, 131 (1994). 
119 Alexander Hamilton, Dec. 13, 1790 Report on a National Bank, in 1 REPORTS OF THE 
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES, PREPARED IN OBEDIENCE TO THE ACT 
OF THE 10TH MAY, 1800 75–76; see also JOHN THOM HOLDSWORTH & DAVIS R. DEWEY, THE 
FIRST AND SECOND BANKS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC. NO. 571, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 
19–22 (1910)  (demonstrating Hamilton modeled the Bank of the United States after the 
Bank of England). 
120 MASHAW, supra note 113, at 47. 
121 See Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, §§ 4, 11, 1 Stat. 191, 192, 196 (providing for election of 
directors according to a plurality of voting shares and limiting the United States’ 
subscription to no more than two million dollars out of the Bank’s total ten million dollar 
capitalization). 
122 See id. § 7, 1 Stat. 193 (expounding on the apportionment of shareholder votes 
throughout sixteen sub-parts). 
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not even enough by themselves to constitute a quorum for doing business; 
private shareholders would choose the remaining twenty.123  Under both 
statutes, the Treasury Department enjoyed some limited supervisory 
authority over the Bank in the sense that the Secretary could demand 
reports and inspect Bank records.  There was, however, no provision for 
presidential or Treasury authority to direct the bank in its operations.124 
What makes this example of attenuated presidential influence so telling 
was that enactment of the Bank’s charter in 1791 was very much the subject 
of constitutional debate.  James Madison famously opposed the Bank as 
going beyond the enumerated powers of Congress, recalling that the 
Philadelphia Convention specifically declined to give Congress an express 
power of incorporation precisely to avoid the establishment of a national 
bank.125  The measure was debated vigorously in the House on constitutional 
grounds, even though unanimously approved by the Senate.126  Nor did 
Congress’s adoption of the Bank bill end the intra-governmental 
deliberations.  President Washington, who, of course, had presided over the 
Constitutional Convention, thought the issue of sufficient moment that, 
prior to signing the Bank’s charter, he sought the formal opinions of his 
Attorney General and Secretaries of State and of the Treasury on the 
constitutional issue.127  We thus have four major statements by leading 
contemporary figures—Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison, and Edmund 
Randolph—all formally assessing the constitutionality of the bank bill. 
Here’s the rub: Not one of these opinions mentions the separation of 
powers as a source of objection or concern.  Jefferson, Madison, and 
Randolph all thought the Bank unconstitutional as going beyond Congress’s 
Article I powers, but none says a word about the lack of presidential 
supervisory authority or indeed anything about the Bank’s attenuated 
accountability to even the Treasury Department.  Hamilton does not 
acknowledge the Executive’s attenuated influence over the Bank as 
 
123 Act of April 10, 1816, ch. 44, §§ 8, 11, 3 Stat. 266, 269–71 (providing for election of 
directors and establishing a quorum of seven). 
124 MASHAW, supra note 113, at 47. 
125 James Madison, Feb. 2, 1791 Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank, in JAMES 
MADISON: WRITINGS 1772–1836, at 480, 482 (1999). 
126 PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 30 (6th ed. 2015). 
127 Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, in 3 THE 
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 445 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed. 1904); Thomas Jefferson, 
Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a National Bank, in THE FEDERALIST: 
A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNTIED STATES BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 
JAMES MADISON, AND JOHN JAY 651–52 (Paul Leicester Ford ed. 1898); Edmund 
Randolph, Feb. 12, 1791 The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill, in H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 3 (1999). 
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something that needs to be constitutionally explained away.  He does not 
mention it at all. 
Intent-oriented originalists might challenge the salience of this 
argument in two respects.  The first is that the relevant actors in both 
Congress and the Executive might have failed to consider any separation of 
powers issue because they deemed the Bank a private and not a 
governmental entity, thus obviously beyond the President’s reach.  Perhaps 
it never occurred to the First Congress that the Bank’s directors and officers 
might be thought Officers of the United States, subject by constitutional 
command to presidential appointment, removal, and direction.  To the 
extent this speculation is accurate, however, it would only make the 
originalist position weaker.  It would imply that those most familiar with the 
Constitution’s drafting and the ratification debates were unaware of any 
authorial intent to confine the delegation of significant government 
authorities even to purely government institutions.  If that’s so—and I think 
it is—then it must follow that there was no authorial intent to confine the 
delegation of discretionary government authority exclusively to officials 
whom the President could command and remove. 
A second speculative riposte might be that separation of powers issues 
were not raised because of the philosophical alignment of the principal 
antagonists.  As Mashaw points out: “Federalists . . . emphasized executive 
leadership in ways that sometimes led their political opponents to brand 
them monarchists.”128  The Virginians—Jefferson, Madison, and Randolph—
could conceivably have been reluctant to criticize the Bank for being under 
insufficient presidential control because such control might have been as 
problematic to the nascent Jeffersonian caucus in Congress as was 
Congress’s extension of its implied legislative powers.129  Any “correction” for 
the former problem would have rendered the Bank even less attractive in 
their eyes.  As for Hamilton and Washington, perhaps they noticed the issue 
but were reluctant to mention it because, as nationalists above all, they 
thought the Bank too important to cavil over matters of executive control.  
(I suspect this latter scenario is deeply counterfactual, given that Hamilton’s 
 
128 Mashaw, supra note 3, at 671–72. 
129 This is not to say that this trio championed a weak presidency.  Whether President 
Jefferson’s own ambitious uses of executive power represented a change from his earlier 
views of the presidency is the subject of debate.  See Jeremy D. Bailey, The Republican 
Executive: Thomas Jefferson and the Development of Presidential Power, in EXTRAORDINARY TIMES 
1–4 (Stephen Dawson et al., eds. 2001) (supporting the proposition that Jefferson desired 
the presidency be characterized by an energetic executive); John Yoo, Jefferson and 
Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 421, 421–25 (2008) (advocating the idea that President 
Jefferson’s actions as President show that he was in favor of a strong presidency within the 
limited framework of the federal government).  On President Jefferson’s and President 
Madison’s views of Article II, see Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 64–82. 
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design for the Bank was always for a private institution; it is doubtful he 
thought he was compromising any constitutional principle.)  In any event, 
since the Bank’s opponents raised no separation of powers arguments, its 
supporters might also have felt no compulsion to raise any. 
In this respect, however, it is enlightening to look at the Bank debate at a 
later stage in history.  As is well known, Congress failed to re-charter the 
Bank when the first charter lapsed in 1811, leaving the U.S. to fight the War 
of 1812 without the aid of a central fiscal institution.  The resulting fiscal 
difficulties130 prompted Congress in 1816 to charter a Second Bank of the 
United States for another twenty years, again much to the chagrin of the 
agricultural states.  Congressional Whigs voted in 1832 to extend the charter 
four years early thinking the move would help them in the 1832 election.131  
Instead, Andrew Jackson made his vehement opposition to the Bank a 
central campaign issue and sent Congress a vigorous and detailed veto 
message.132 
Key portions of Jackson’s message, reminiscent of earlier statements in 
opposition to the Bank, again challenged the Bank as unconstitutional.  
While taking note that the Supreme Court had approved Congress’s 
exertion of an implicit incorporation power, Jackson took the position that 
the Supreme Court had been appropriately deferential to the elected 
branches in applying the Necessary and Proper Clause, but that he, as 
President, need not be.133 
 
130 The First National Bank would have been insufficiently capitalized to lend the 
government enough money to finance a war, and reliance on the First National Bank was 
not the Monroe Administration’s plan.  Its hope lay instead with the chartering of a 
Second National Bank with much greater capital.  The failure to recharter the Bank also 
meant there were no national banks to convert bank notes into specie, resulting in a 
proliferation of state currencies and the necessity for the Treasury Department to accept 
private banknotes in payment of taxes—a process that required Treasury to have to 
negotiate continually over the terms of exchange.  See MAX M. EDLING, A HERCULES IN 
THE CRADLE: WAR, MONEY, AND THE AMERICAN STATE, 1783–1867, at 122–23 (2014). 
131 BREST ET AL., supra note 126, at 77. 
132 Veto Message from President Jackson Regarding the Bank of the United States (July 10, 
1832), reprinted in JAMES D. RICHARDSON, ED., A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1139–1154 (1897). 
133 Id. at 1146 (“The principle [the Court] affirmed is that the ‘degree of its necessity,’ 
involving all the details of a banking institution, is a question exclusively for legislative 
consideration.  A bank is constitutional, but it is the province of the Legislature to 
determine whether this or that particular power, privilege, or exemption is ‘necessary and 
proper’ to enable the bank to discharge its duties to the Government, and from their 
decision there is no appeal to the courts of justice.  Under the decision of the Supreme 
Court, therefore, it is the exclusive province of Congress and the President to decide 
whether the particular features of this act are necessary and proper in order to enable the 
bank to perform conveniently and efficiently the public duties assigned to it as a fiscal 
agent, and therefore constitutional, or unnecessary and improper, and therefore 
unconstitutional.”) 
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Jackson did not doubt that the Bank was established to be an agency of 
government.  And, unlike his anti-Federalist forebears, he was no critic of a 
strong presidency.  On the contrary, modern advocates of a hard unitary 
executive cite the Jackson Administration as a source of significant 
precedents in support.134  Jackson was thus intellectually and politically well 
positioned to voice any available separation of powers attack on the Bank.  
But Jackson—who had every reason to attack the Bank on any plausible 
constitutional basis and who was, at that stage in history, our most pro-
executive Chief Executive, did not object to the Bank on any separation of 
powers ground.  In a veto message exceeding 8000 words, the Bank’s 
relationship to the Executive is mentioned only once: 
The bank is professedly established as an agent of the executive branch 
of the Government, and its constitutionality is maintained on that 
ground.  Neither upon the propriety of present action nor upon the 
provisions of this act was the Executive consulted.  It has had no 
opportunity to say that it neither needs nor wants an agent clothed with 
such powers and favored by such exemptions.  There is nothing in its 
legitimate functions which makes it necessary or proper.  Whatever 
interest or influence, whether public or private, has given birth to this 
act, it can not be found either in the wishes or necessities of the executive 
department, by which present action is deemed premature, and the 
powers conferred upon its agent not only unnecessary, but dangerous to 
the Government and country.135 
In other words, Jackson’s objections to the Bank on behalf of the 
executive branch had nothing to do with his non-supervision of the Bank, 
but rather to the reenactment of its charter under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause without taking account of Jackson’s view that the Bank did not meet 
appropriate tests of necessity and propriety.  Had strong grounds emerged 
between 1789 and 1832 to support a view of founding intent as mandating 
the hard version of the unitary presidency, no one would have been likelier 
to say so than Andrew Jackson.  He did not.  This is a revealing dog that did 
not bark. 
The National Bank example hardly exhausts the case against an intent-
based originalist argument for a hard unitary executive.  It dramatically 
illustrates, however, “the limitations of . . . historical claims that the 
relationship of administrations to the political and legal branches of 
government was well-established early in the nation’s history.”136  As research 
into both state and federal practice shows, public administration was 
 
134 Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 95–104. 
135 Veto Message from President Jackson, supra note 132, at 1152–53.  It is worth noting that 
my argument holds whether or not Jackson accurately understood the Bank to be a 
government institution.  My point is that he thought it was and yet failed to object to it on 
separation of powers grounds. 
136 Mashaw, supra note 113, at 11. 
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frequently organized in ways that are inconsistent with the hard unitary 
executive paradigm.  Originalist defenders of a hard unitary executive are 
thus left with arguing that the exceptions are inapposite, that the founding 
generation did not actually understand its constitutional documents, or that 
the texts of the documents were just lip service to principles that legislatures 
governed by the late eighteenth century constitutions simply violated with 
regularity.  There is, of course, a simpler explanation—that the documents 
were all but universally understood as giving legislatures substantial freedom 
to organize public administration, including decisions to limit direct chief 
executive control over administrative outcomes.  Understood in this way, 
history confirms Professor Mashaw’s conclusion: “The notion that we have 
fallen in the modern era from some prior state of separation-of-powers 
grace . . . is simply a mistake.”137 
CONCLUSION 
The supposed appeal of original public meaning originalism is largely 
two-fold.  With respect to methodology, it purports to avoid the attribution 
of intent problems often cited with respect to old-style originalism.  On a 
normative level, if the relevant text had a conventional, stable meaning at 
the time of its use, then shared knowledge of that meaning would cause 
those drafting the Constitution and those voting for and against it to possess 
a common understanding of what they were collectively producing.  It is this 
imagined consensus that gives weight to the claim that modern readers of 
the Constitution should treat the text as significantly constraining.  With 
regard to the vesting of executive power, original public meaning 
originalism substantiates, at least as clearly as old-style original intent-based 
originalism, that the founding generation did not have any “fixed general 
idea about the relationship of the President [or a governor] to 
administration.”138 
Skeptical readers may still think this argument gives too little weight to 
the syllogism noted above.  Does not the vesting of “the” executive power in 
“a” President demand that executive power be treated as a single, indivisible 
thing that may be assigned to no official other than the President?  Given 
Article I, it plainly does not.  That is, the Constitution, as Professor Prakash 
himself recognizes, “grants some eighteenth century executive powers—such 
as the powers over war and foreign commerce—to Congress.”139  At the very 
least, this implies that the Executive Power Vesting Clause needs to be read 
as follows: “Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the executive 
 
137 Id. at 25. 
138 Mashaw, supra note 3, at 668. 
139 PRAKASH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE, supra note 5, at 83. 
Dec. 2016] THE ORIGINALIST MYTH 361 
 
power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”  The 
implicit Exceptions Clause might itself be regarded as a repudiation of the 
hard version of unitary executive theory. 
But even considered linguistically, the weight that unitarians attach to 
“the” and “a” is simply too great.  To see this, imagine that Article II opened 
as follows: “Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America.”  The absence of any modifier preceding “[e]xecutive 
power” could have easily signaled that executive power might also be vested 
elsewhere—perhaps in the “officers” and “executive departments” 
mentioned elsewhere in Article II—so long as those specific executive 
powers constitutionally lodged with the President remained intact.  If I am 
right about this, then the notion of an indivisible executive power rests 
entirely with the word, “the.” 
Yet even a moment’s reflection reminds us that “the” is often used in a 
manner that does not suggest singularity or exclusivity.  Imagine that the 
Constitution provided: “The dessert shall be the tastiest part of the 
President’s dinner.”  This would mean exactly the same as: “Dessert shall be 
the tastiest part of the President’s dinner.”  The use of the word “the” is 
compatible with the notion of a dessert that is not a singular presidential 
entitlement.  Others may have dessert, too.  Thus, unlike Article III, which 
conveys to the courts not just “the judicial power,” but “the judicial power of 
the United States”—a rather clear signal of comprehensiveness—Article II 
can be read to permit the legislative allocation of executive power to 
members of the executive branch other than the President.  Even as to those 
officers, of course, the President must “take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed.”  But the President need not have power to execute the laws 
personally.  The President need not enjoy removal power at will in the face 
of contrary statutes.  The President need not have the authority to demand, 
without firing an official, that the official exercise his or her discretionary 
authority in the manner the President prefers. 
This does not necessarily mean that a hard unitary executive reading of 
the Constitution is unjustified; it simply cannot be justified adequately 
through any narrowly formalist version of originalism.  Whether the 
Constitution commands a hard version of the unitary executive should be 
understood as a question of nonoriginalist, albeit historically informed 
constitutional construction.  That construction, in turn, should be a 
pragmatic one, taking due cognizance of a variety of considerations.  These 
would include the general values that animated the 1787 Constitution, our 
now-more-than-two centuries of institutional practice, and what we have 
learned and are still learning about the relationship of different institutional 
arrangements to different kinds of institutional outcomes.  Debates about 
these factors are no more likely to yield broad consensus conclusions than 
are debates over the meaning of historical texts.  But that uncertainty is itself 
362 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:2 
 
an argument for constitutional fluidity—for giving our political institutions 
more, rather than less power to structure and restructure their 
interrelationship.  Absent compelling evidence, courts and originalist 
scholars should be reluctant to bind the elected branches to any one highly 
debatable view of the constitutional organization chart.  Nothing in the 
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Article Fourth. Of the Executive Department. 
§ 19. A Controller of the public accounts shall be 
annually appointed by the General Assembly.  
Delaware  
1792 
Art. II, § 8. [The governor] shall appoint all officers 
whose offices are established by this constitution, or 
shall be established by law, and whose appointments 
are not herein otherwise provided for . . . . 
Art. VIII, § 3. The State treasurer shall be appointed 
annually by the house of representatives, with the 
concurrence of the Senate. 
Art. VIII, § 6. Attorneys at law, all inferior officers in the 
treasury department, election officers, officers relating 
to taxes, to the poor, and to highways, constables and 
hundred officers, shall be appointed in such manner as 
is or may be directed by law.
Georgia  
1789 
Art. IV, § 2. All elections shall be by ballot, and the 
house of representatives, in all appointments of State 
officers, shall vote for three persons; and a list of the 
three persons having the highest number of votes shall 
be signed by the speaker, and sent to the Senate, which 
shall from such list determine, by a majority of their 
votes, the officer elected, except militia officers and the 
secretaries of the governor, who shall be appointed by 
the governor alone, under such regulations and 
restrictions as the General Assembly may prescribe. The 
General Assembly may vest the appointment of inferior 
officers in the governor, the courts of justice, or in such 
other manner as they may by law establish.
Kentucky  
1792 
Art. II, § 8. [The governor] shall nominate, and by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint all 
officers, whose offices are established by this 
Constitution, or shall be established by law, and whose 
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for . . . 
. 
Art. VI, § 7. The State Treasurer shall be appointed 
annually by the joint ballot of both Houses.
 
 




Art. X. [The House of Delegates] may examine and 
pass all accounts of the State, relating either to the 
collection or expenditure of the revenue, or appoint 
auditors, to state and adjust the same.  
Art. XIII. That the Treasurers (one for the western, and 
another for the eastern shore) and the Commissioners 
of the Loan Office, may be appointed by the House of 
Delegates, during their pleasure . . . . 
Art. XLI. That there be a Register of Wills appointed 
for each county who shall be commissioned by the 
Governor, on the joint recommendation of the Senate 
and House of Delegates . . . 
Art. XLVIII. That the Governor, for the time being, 
with the advice and consent of the Council, may 
appoint the Chancellor, and all Judges and Justices, the 
Attorney-General, Naval Officers, officers in the regular 
land and sea service, officers of the militia, Registers of 
the Land Office, Surveyors, and all other civil officers of 
government (Assessors, Constables, and Overseers of 
the roads only excepted) and may also suspend or 
remove any civil officer who has not a commission, 
during good behaviour; and may suspend any militia 
officer, for one month: and may also suspend or 
remove any regular officer in the land or sea service: 
and the Governor may remove or suspend any militia 




Chapter 2, § 1, Art. IX. All judicial officers, the 
attorney-general, the solicitor-general, all sheriffs, 
coroners, and registers of probate, shall be nominated 
and appointed by the governor, by and with the advice 
and consent of the council; and every such nomination 
shall be made by the governor, and made at least seven 
days prior to such appointment. 
Chapter 2, § 4, Art. I. The secretary, treasurer, and 
receiver-general, and the commissary-general, notaries 
public, and naval officers, shall be chosen annually, by 













Part Second, FORM OF GOVERNMENT, § V: And 
farther, full power and authority are hereby given and 
granted to the said general court . . . to name and settle 
annually, or provide by fixed laws for the naming and 
settling, of all civil officers within this State; such 
officers excepted the election and appointment of 
whom are hereafter in this form of government 
otherwise provided for; and to set forth the several 
duties, powers, and limits of the several civil and 
military officers of this State. 
§ XLVI. All judicial officers, the attorney-general, 
solicitors, all sheriffs, coroners, registers of probate, and 
all officers of the navy, and general and field officers of 
the militia shall be nominated and appointed by the 
governor and council; and every such nomination shall 
be made at least three days prior to such appointment; 
and no appointment shall take place unless a majority 
of the council agree thereto. 
§ XLVII. The governor and council shall have a 
negative on each other, both in the nominations and 
appointments. Every nomination and appointment 
shall be signed by the governor and council, and every 
negative shall be also signed by the governor or council 
who made the same. 
§ LXVII. The secretary, treasurer, and commissary-
general shall be chosen by joint ballot of the senators 
and representatives, assembled in one room.
New Jersey  
1776 
Art. XII. [T]he Attorney-General, and Provincial 
Secretary, shall continue in office for five years: and the 
Provincial Treasurer shall continue in office for one 
year; and that they shall be severally appointed by the 
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New York  
1777 
Art. XXII. And this convention doth further, in the 
name and by the authority of the good people of this 
State, ordain, determine, and declare, that the 
treasurer of this State shall be appointed by act of the 
legislature, to originate with the assembly: Provided, 
that he shall not be elected out of either branch of the 
legislature. 
Art. XXIII. That all officers, other than those who, by 
this constitution, are directed to be otherwise 
appointed, shall be appointed in the manner following, 
to wit: The assembly shall, once in every year, openly 
nominate and appoint one of the senators from each 
great district, which senators shall form a council for 
the appointment of the said officers, of which the 
governor for the time being, or the lieutenant 
governor, or the President of the senate, when they 
shall respectively administer the government, shall be 
President and have a casting voice, but no other vote; 
and with the advice and consent of the said council, 
shall appoint all the said officers; and that a majority of 
the said council be a quorum.
North Carolina 
1776 
Art. XIII. That the General Assembly shall, by joint 
ballot of both houses, appoint /. . . [the] Attorney-
General, who shall be commissioned by the Governor, 
and hold . . . office[] during good behavior. 
Art. XXII. That the General Assembly shall, by joint 
ballot of both Houses, annually appoint a Treasurer or 
Treasurers for this State. 
Art. XXIV. That the General Assembly shall, by joint 




Art. II, § 16—A secretary of State shall be appointed by 
a joint ballot of the Senate and House of 
Representatives . . . 
Art. VI, § 2—The State Treasurer and Auditor shall be 
triennially appointed by a joint ballot of both Houses of 
the Legislature. 
Art. VI, § 4—The appointments of all civil officers, not 
otherwise directed by this constitution, shall be made in 
such manner as may be directed by law.
 
 






Art. II, Sect. VIII. [The governor] shall appoint all 
officers, whose offices are established by this 
Constitution, or shall be established by law, and whose 
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for . . . 
Art. V, Sect. V. The State Treasurer shall be appointed, 
annually, by the joint vote of the members of both 
Houses. All other officers in the treasury department, 
attornies at law, election officers, officers relating to 
taxes, to the poor and highways, constables, and other 
township officers, shall be appointed in such manner as 
is or shall be directed by law.
South Carolina 
1790 
Art. VI, § 1. The . . . commissioners of the treasury, 
secretary of the State, and surveyor-general shall be 
elected by the joint ballot of both houses in the house 
of representatives. . . . 
Art. VI, § 2. All other officers shall be appointed as they 




Art. V, § 2nd. The general assembly shall, by joint ballot 
of both houses, appoint . . . an attorney or attorneys for 
the State, who shall hold their respective offices during 
good behavior. 
Art. VI, § 3rd. The appointment of all officers, not 







 140 This section would appear to carry forward the relevant portions of the South Carolina 
Constitution of 1778, which provided as follows: 
 
XXIX. That two commissioners of the treasury, the secretary of the State, the 
register of mesne conveyances in each district, attorney-general, surveyor-general, 
powder-receiver, collectors and comptrollers of the customs and waiters, be 
chosen . . . by the senate and house of representatives jointly, by ballot, in the 
house of representatives . . . 
 
XXXII. That the governor and commander-in-chief, with the advice and consent 
of the privy council, may appoint during pleasure, until otherwise directed by law, 
all other necessary officers, except such as are now by law directed to be otherwise 
chosen. 





Chap. II, § 10. The Supreme Executive Council of this 
State, shall consist of a 
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and twelve persons, 
chosen in the following manner, viz. The freemen of 
each town shall, on the day of election for choosing 
Representatives to attend the General Assembly, bring 
in their votes for Governor, with his name fairly 
written, to the Constable, who shall seal them up, and 
write on them, Votes for the Governor, and deliver 
them to the Representative chosen to attend the 
General Assembly; and at the opening of the General 
Assembly, there shall be a committee appointed out of 
the Council and Assembly, who, after being duly sworn 
to the faithful discharge of their trust, shall proceed to 
receive, sort, and count the votes for the Governor, and 
declare the person who has the major part of the votes, 
to be Governor for the year ensuing. And if there be 
no choice made, then the Council and General 
Assembly, by their joint ballot, shall make choice of a 
Governor. The Lieutenant Governor and Treasurer 
shall be chosen in the manner above directed. And 
each freeman shall give in twelve votes for twelve 
Councillors, in the same manner, and the twelve 
highest in nomination shall serve for the ensuing year 
as Councillors. 
Chap. II, § 11. The Governor, and in his absence the 
Lieutenant Governor, with the 
Council, (a major part of whom, including the 
Governor or Lieutenant Governor, shall be a quorum 
to transact business) shall have power to commission 
all Officers—and also to appoint Officers, except 
where provision is, or shall be otherwise made, by law, 
or this Frame of Government . . .
Virginia 
1776 
Unnumbered para. 35. The two Houses of Assembly 
shall, by joint ballot, appoint . . . [the] Secretary, and 
the Attorney-General, to be commissioned by the 
Governor, and continue in office during good 
behaviour. 
Unnumbered para. 40. A Treasurer shall be appointed 
annually, by joint ballot of both Houses.
 
 
